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Abstract
This thesis mainly focusses on the behaviour of humans and animals when competing
(or cooperating) in a shared environment. We relate their behaviour to a selection
of games, namely, the hawk-dove game and the prisoner’s dilemma. We first aim
to give an overview of the link between species interactions and game theory whilst
introducing the spatial and non-spatial interaction with memory. We then analyse
the temporal dynamics of a large population of spatially distributed agents who recall
each other’s previous actions whilst assuming that individuals are anti-conformists.
We extend a recently published analysis of memory effects in the hawk-dove game
by first introducing an alternative derivation of the results and then extending to
new types of memory dynamics. We explore two different types of trapline dynamics,
Cross dynamics of space use and an iterative model of trapline foraging, to explore
movement patterns of individuals while capturing their memory and interactions.
Finally, we explore the birth-death process whilst considering the two dimensional
case.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The overall aim of this research is to understand how people or animals adapt their
behaviour when competing (or cooperating) in a shared environment. Competition
and cooperation can arise in a variety of circumstances and all forms of life must
eventually engage in competition in order to survive.
1.1 Overview
Competition and cooperation are important game mechanisms frequently used by
living organisms [1]. These mechanisms influence engagement, motivation, goal set-
ting, and ultimately behaviour [2]. While some behaviours are inborn, many are
learned from experience [3]. The faculty by which the mind of an individual learns
information is known as memory [4, 5, 6, 7, 8].
Humans and animals can change their behaviours, as they seek to maximise their
self-interests according to the information available in their memory [9, 10, 11, 12, 13].
The appropriate framework with which to model the behaviour of humans and animals
in strategic situations is known as game theory [14]. In the next two sub-sections, we
will give an overview of games applied to humans and animal behaviour as well as
the spatial foraging competition between animals.
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1.1.1 Games and memory
Species interactions can be seen as foraging games, with the players routinely altering
their behaviour in response to changes in their physical and social environment [15].
The choice of an individual to behave in a certain way can be seen as a choice
of a strategy in a game against others, designed to maximise her return. Game
theory provides a strong theoretical framework to scientists for understanding the
mechanisms by which species coexist [16].
Game theory is the study of the ways in which interacting choices of rational agents
produce outcomes with respect to the utilities (or preferences) of those agents, where
the outcomes in question might have been intended by none of the agents [17, 18].
The fundamental idea of game theory is that an agent in an interactive decision should
and does take into account the deliberations of her opponents, who, in turn, take into
account her deliberations. A rational agent in an interactive situation should therefore
not ask: “What can I do, given what is likely to happen?” but rather: “What can
I do in response to what they do, given that they have a belief about what I will
do?” Based on this perspective, game theory recommends rational choices for these
situations, and predicts agents’ behaviour in them. Game theory focuses on those
situations in which outcomes are determined by interactions of deliberating agents.
It proposes that agents take outcomes as determined by other agents’ reasoning, and
that each agent therefore assesses the likelihood of an outcome by trying to figure
out how the other agents they interact with will reason. The likelihoods of outcomes
therefore becomes “endogenous” in the sense that players take their opponents’ payoffs
and rationality into account when figuring out the consequences of their strategies.
Traditionally, game theory studies the equilibria of simple types of games [19] such
as
 Simultaneous games: When players effectively make their decisions at the
same time without knowing in advance the choices of other players when making
their decisions (e.g; The prisoner’s dilemma [20])
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 Sequential games: Players take alternate turns to make their choices (e.g;
chess [21])
 One-Shot games: The game is played only once. The payoff may be such
that a game might be impossible to play twice
 Zero sum games: The sum of the payoffs to the players equals zero. A player
can have a positive payoff only if another has a negative payoff (e.g; poker)
A game consists of players, strategies, payoffs and might also involve some form of
pre-commitment [22]. The contestants or the players in a game are individuals who
can choose a particular strategy (e.g., ‘fight’, ‘display’, ‘run away’) [23].
The ideas and methods of evolutionary game theory have been applied in a wide
range of situations, including animal contests [24, 25], and more explicitly, among
humans [26, 27, 28].
In the case of animals, contesting for limited resources may be costly, in terms of
energy use, risk, time or the possibility of death [29, 30]. Having the ability to gather
information about their foraging journey to obtain resources is therefore crucial as it
influences their strategic interactions when competing against others [31]. We want
to understand the effect that memory has on animals’ foraging strategies.
1.1.2 Spatial memory
The desire to understand animal behaviour gave rise to a broad field of research.
An interesting part of this field is concerned with the movement patterns of foragers
[32, 33, 34, 35, 36].
Movement is one of the most fundamental features of life on earth [37]. It is a
crucial component of almost any evolutionary and ecological process associated with
problems such as biological invasions [38, 39, 40, 41] and the spread of diseases [42,
43]. The prophet Jeremiah (7th century B.C.), for instance, explained the temporal
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consistency in migratory patterns of birds [44, 45], and Aristotle (4th century B.C.)
searched for common features unifying animal movement [46, 47].
Characterising animal movement in statistical terms is challenging because of the
difficulty in modelling all the biological factors relevant to describe animal movement
[48, 49, 50]. Simplified stochastic models have been introduced into foraging research
as they play an important role by providing us with tools to examine, model and
simulate the behaviour of foragers [51, 52].
Extensive use of experimental devices such as GPS and bio-loggers have been
recognised as the genesis of exciting scientific advances that have contributed to
movement research [53, 54, 48, 55]. New tools and concepts from the field of sta-
tistical physics have allowed researchers to record intimate details of animal lives
and interpret animal movement [56, 57, 58, 11]. These have enriched the biological
discussion on the topics of animal behavioural ecology [59, 60]. One particularly im-
portant topic is how social conformity and group-size-dependent effects shape group
level-characteristics [61, 62, 63]. In this work, we will be particularly interested in a
type of movement known as ‘traplining’.
Many animals have been observed to collect food from resource renewable patches
in repeated sequences. This behaviour is called ‘traplining’ by analogy with fur-
trappers checking their traps by following habitual routes [64]. Animals such as bum-
ble bees [65, 66, 67], euglossine bees [68], hummingbirds [69], wagtails [70], bats [71]
and primates [72] have all been observed exhibiting traplining behaviour. Traplining
is a learned behaviour that develops over a time period [73]. Each forager begins its
foraging life without prior knowledge of the locations and values of rewards. It then
gradually develops a fixed trapline to harvest the renewing food in a systematic way.
Traplining foragers are faced with dynamic routing problems analogous to the
well-known travelling salesman problem [74]. However, maintaining some level of
route flexibility could allow animals to find solutions to complex routing problems
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by improving foraging performance in different ways, whether by allowing foragers
to (1) exploit overlapping areas shared with less experienced individuals [69, 73],
(2) travel efficiently by increasing the accuracy of movements [75, 76], (3) remember
the locations of the most rewarding resources [77, 78], or (4) to optimise visitation
schedules in relation to the replenishment rates of food sources [79, 80].
In this thesis, we first want to understand the dynamics of strategy change in-
fluenced by the frequency of competing strategies in a population. We shall use the
classical hawk-dove game which models conflict between two players in game theory
[81, 82]. We will then model the behaviour of trapliners whilst exploring the way they
forage under competition and cooperation [83, 69, 84, 75]. Many tests of traplining
have involved nectarivorous animals foraging on floral nectar [80]. Consequently, we
shall concentrate on this group of animals, although the principles of the thesis may
apply to any trapliner.
1.2 Aims and objectives of the research
Our interest in games applied to humans and animals came from the study of mathe-
matical models of strategic interaction between rational decision makers. Using game
theory, we first wanted to provide an alternative derivation of the results in a recently
published analysis of memory effects in the hawk-dove game and aimed to extend
the work to new types of memory dynamics. We have also developed some interest
in statistical foraging after reading some of the work that ecologists had done on
so-called ‘home ranges’. A home range is part of an individual’s cognitive map of her
environment that she chooses to keep updating [85]. We wanted to understand how
and why home ranges separate and the point at which this happens.
The above aims raise the following core project objectives:
 Social Interaction with memory: We explore the temporal dynamics of
a large population of agents who recall each other’s previous actions whilst
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assuming that individuals are anti-conformists.
 Trapline dynamics: We investigate the behaviour of a single player in a
system (one player game) and multiple players by means of competition and
cooperation. We want to understand how individuals determine their optimal
strategy given the resources available in their territories and the costs of de-
fending them. We seek to understand the spatial patterns in which individuals
distribute their activities by considering environmental factors (e.g. availability
of resources, competition, reproduction and predation).
 Birth-death process: We explore a popular biologically motivated model of
evolution in finite populations in a two dimensional case.
We conducted research on the statistical physics modelling of the dynamics of
strategy change influenced by the frequency of competing strategies in a population.
In chapter 1, we have given an overview of the spatial and non-spatial interactions
between individuals whilst taking their memory into account. We have introduced the
concept of game theory for understanding the mechanisms by which species coexist.
In chapter 2, we analysed the temporal dynamics of a large population of agents
who recall each other’s previous actions whilst assuming that individuals are anti-
conformists. Using game theory, we first provided an alternative derivation of the
results in a recently publish analysis of memory effects in the hawk-dove game. We
then extended the work to three types of memory: bus-stop memory, exponential
memory and mixed (bus-stop and exponential memory). In the bus-stop memory,
we found that when agents have a small memory, the system possesses a stable fixed
point. However, having a long memory or update rate destabilises the fixed point
which then creates a limit cycle via a Hopf bifurcation. In the exponential memory, we
found that the average probability weight associated with the ‘hawk’ strategy reaches
stability for any memory length and update rate. In the bus-stop and exponential
memory kernel, a player uses the bus-stop memory with probability p and uses the
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exponential memory with probability 1−p. The probabilities 1−p and p govern how
stable and unstable a system is. Next, we have explored the anticonformist dynamics
of a new type of game considering the non-spatial case. Using the gamma memory
kernel, we have determined the stability of the fixed point where the population sticks
to a particular response. We have also explored coupled oscillations representing the
behaviour of two populations that are fully connected within themselves and also
coupled together. After simulating the behaviour of the average strategy for a group
of players we have found that if two oscillations are out of phase then provided the
coupling is not too strong, over time they come to phase. We note that the parameter
β in the gamma distribution determines whether the behaviour of the population is
stable or not. In other words, β measures strength of the conformity.
In chapter 3, we have used two minimal statistical physics style models (‘Cross
dynamics of space use’ and the ’Iterative model of trapline foraging’) to explore the
movement patterns of individuals while capturing their memory and interactions.
In the cross dynamics of space use, we have looked at the evolution of strategies
by means of a learning process between interacting agents. From this model, we
have found that the payoffs of players corresponding to a given profile of strategies
are correlated and that correlation has a significant effect on the expected number
of Nash equilibria. The correlation is negative if a player doing well by having a
higher payoff means that the other player does badly. When this occurs, the other
player would want to change her line because she will be better off trying other lines
to improve her payoff. As a result of this, it will be less likely to have any Nash
equilibria payoffs. On the other hand, if the system size is big in comparison to the
players’ lines the players can have entirely separated lines which means that their
payoffs will tend to be positively correlated. When correlation is high, players can
have different strategies that will reward them with high payoffs which means that
there will be many Nash equilibria payoffs. From the simulation results, we have also
found that players eventually settle on a particular strategy without ever changing
it. This behaviour is less natural because we would expect players to occasionally
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change their strategies.
In the Iterative model of trapline foraging, we have considered the fully connected
topology and derived a stochastic ODE model as an approximated version of the
full model. We derived this simplified model because it was prohibitively slow to
investigate the full model version. It offers the hope of a fixed point analysis in the
future. We have explored the players’ line lengths and discovered that there are five
classes of sharing behaviour: ‘No sites’, ‘Perfect share’, ‘Switching’, ‘Dominant’ and
‘All sites’ (see list 3.4.2 for definition of each class of sharing behaviour). We found
that the ‘switching’ phase does not appear in the full simulation (see Figure 3.26)
and we believe that this is due to some stochastic effect.
Next, we have explored the growth rate of the players’ line lengths using the full
model and stochastic mean field model. In the simulation, the players have the same
line lengths. In the case where all sites in the system have been used by the players,
the only sites that either player can consider adding are their opponent’s non-shared
sites. However, there is a small chance that a player will visit any of the other player’s
non-shared sites since the players have the same line lengths. The chance of a player
visiting one of the other player’s sites is the probability that the amount of food found
at the site she is visiting is higher than her average food gain. Occasionally by chance
a player’ sites may look good and if this happens often enough the other player will
start to overlap even more with that player. Note that if the players have no overlap
whatsoever then a player’s sites just never look any good as the other player will
either gain less or about the same amount of food on average.
In chapter 4, we have explored a popular biologically motivated model of evolu-
tion in finite populations in a two dimensional system where the set of sites available
for a player to visit depends on the location of the player and her maximum flight
distance, Λ. We have found that a population of shrinkers do better than the popu-
lation of expanders provided that the populations are in two different systems. After
exploring the population of shrinkers and expanders in the same system we have
found that shrinkers and expanders cannot coexist in the same system as the popu-
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lation of expanders always out-compete the population of shrinkers in the long run.
Consequently, shrinkers are excluded from the system as they become extinct.
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Chapter 2
Dynamics of social interaction with
memory
In the social world, we must often remember, manipulate and update the information
about other people in our memory [86, 87]. There is a growing evidence that memory
is a significant contributor to adaptive social cognition [88, 89, 90, 91].
Memory enables social interactions in a variety of ways [92]. In order to success-
fully engage in social interactions, people must have the ability to remember personal
experienced events [93]. The extent to which we recall details of previous encounters
influences future interactions [94].
In game theory, games of strategic interaction have been used to model various real
world phenomena [95]. For example, the ‘hawk-dove’ game has been used extensively
as a model for real world conflict and cooperation [96]. Such games are often called
social dilemmas to emphasize their relevance for the real world [97]. We refer here
to games that are repeated multiple times such that the players adapt their strategy
based on the information they have acquired in the past.
The behavioural strategy of an individual can change over time in response to her
past interactions. For example, she can display a particular behaviour because it is the
most frequent the individual witnessed in others [98]. This type of behaviour, better
known as conformity [99, 100] has become an active topic in behavioural ecology and
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evolutionary biology [101, 102]. Conformity is an important force in cultural evolution
because it has the potential to stabilise cooperation in large groups [103]. Another
type of behaviour that an individual may display is anti-conformity [104] which occurs
when the individual consciously and deliberately challenges the position or actions of
the group.
In this chapter, we first extend a recently published analysis of memory effects
in the ‘hawk-dove’ game [105] by providing an alternative derivation of the results
and then extending to new types of memory dynamics. We describe and explore
various types of memory dynamics representing the importance of previous states of
the system. Suppose that the state of a system at time t is represented as φ(t) then
the memory of φ(t) can be expressed as
µ(t) =
∫ t
−∞
φ(s)µ(t− s)ds, (2.1)
where µ is some memory kernel function.
We have explored the bus-stop memory kernel and the exponential memory kernel
as one memory kernel (bus-stop memory kernel) shows instability whereas the other
(exponential memory kernel) shows stability. We then analysed the intermediate of
both memory kernels as it is the midpoint of the two memory kernels (bus-stop and
exponential). Next, we explore a different type of game and analyse the temporal
dynamics of a large population of agents who recall each other’s previous actions
whilst assuming that individuals are anti-conformists. Without loss of generality we
refer to these strategies as ‘Hawk’ (H) and ‘Dove’ (D) by allusion of the hawk-dove
game [106, 107, 108]. In this game, we shall explore the gamma memory kernel where
agents use a particular strategy less if the number of players that they see playing
that strategy increases. Note that the hawk-dove game and the anti-conformity game
have similar properties.
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2.1 Hawk-dove game
Maynard Smith [25] came up with the ‘hawk-dove game’ to understand animal con-
tests over resources [109, 110, 111, 112]. In this game, it is assumed that during a
contest an individual can behave in one of the three ways, ‘display’, ‘escalate’, and
‘retreat’. It is further assumed that individuals in a given contest can adopt one of
the two strategies: ‘Hawk’ or ‘Dove’. These two strategies are defined as follows
 ‘Hawk’ (H): Escalate and continue until injured or until opponent retreats
 ‘Dove’ (D): Display, retreat at once if the opponent escalates
The ‘Dove’ strategy exemplifies cooperative behaviour without intraspecies conflict,
while the ‘Hawk’ strategy represents aggressive behaviour.
The game is related to the prisoner’s dilemma [113, 114]. The hawk-dove model
has been applied to explore animal behaviour and its evolution [115]. The hawk-dove
game approach may be used in social science to manage customer expectation, and
thus help firms perform well [116]. In political science, a hawk-dove approach has
been used to investigate international relations in a number of different ways [117].
Let us suppose that the agents in the game are contesting a resource with a
certain value V > 0, and we let C represent the cost of direct conflict incurred by an
individual whilst assuming that V < C. The way the game works is shown in the
following payoff matrix
Player j
H D
Player i
H V−C
2
V
D 0 V
2
The payoffs are for player i employing the strategies in the rows against player
j employing the strategy in the columns. In the upper left quadrant, an encounter
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of hawk versus hawk the payoff to player i is one half of the resource minus the
cost of direct conflict between the aggressive strategies. We assume an equal payoff
for both hawks. A hawk encountering a dove obtains the entirety of the resource,
while the dove receives none with both avoiding the cost of direct conflict, as shown
in the upper right and lower left quadrant, respectively. If both players adopt the
dove strategy, the mutual payoff is the highest, with both players evenly dividing the
benefit without cost of conflict (bottom right quadrant).
Question: Are either of the two strategies evolutionarily stable?
In some populations, all individuals may employ a particular strategy. Such a strategy
is said to be an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) if that strategy cannot be invaded
by any other strategy through natural selection [25, 118].
Let F (q|p) be the average fitness of a group of individuals playing a game against
members of a population in state p. A state p is called an ESS if for every state q 6= p,
the perturbed state p¯ = (1 − )p + q satisfies F (q|p¯) < F (p|p¯) for sufficiently small
 > 0.
The evolutionarily-stable strategy is a fundamental concept in the analysis of
each variant of the hawk-dove game [119]. We want to know if either of the two
strategies (H or D) in the ‘hawk-dove’ game is evolutionarily stable. Imagine that we
keep repeating the hawk-dove game with random pairing in an infinite population in
which the only relevant consideration is that successful players multiply more rapidly
that unsuccessful players. Suppose that all the players (the incumbents) play strategy
I, which can be a pure or a mixed strategy. If I is stable in the sense that a mutant
playing a different strategy N (pure or mixed) cannot successfully invade, then I
is an ESS. For the purpose of this qualitative analysis, we introduce and define the
following:
 I - incumbent strategy in a homogeneous population (I ∈ {H,D}).
 N - new invading strategy (N ∈ {H,D}).
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 E(A,B) - expected payoff from A competing against B where A,B ∈ {I,N}
For I to be an evolutionarily stable strategy the following criteria must then be
satisfied
 Either E(I, I) > E(N, I): payoff from I competing against itself must be greater
than payoff from N competing against I, or
 E(I, I) = E(N, I) and E(I,N) > E(N,N): if payoff from I competing against
itself equals payoff from N competing against I, payoff from I competing against
N must be greater than payoff from N competing against N .
Suppose that H is the incumbent strategy and D is the invading strategy. Looking
at the payoff matrix for the ‘hawk-dove’ game, we can see that the payoff from D going
against itself is less than the payoff from H going against D (i.e E(D,D) < E(H,D))
and this tells us that a population of doves can be invaded by a hawk mutant.
Let us now suppose that H is the incumbent strategy and D is the invading
strategy. In this scenario, H is an evolutionarily stable strategy if V−C
2
> 0, or V > C
(the value of resource is high relative to the cost of injury involved in obtaining it).
If V > C then the payoff from hawk going against itself is greater than from D going
against H (i.e. E(H,H) > E(D,H)) which means that H is an evolutionarily stable
strategy. On the other hand, if V < C, a dove mutant can invade a population of
hawks; thus H will not be an evolutionarily stable strategy.
In the ‘Delayed response in the hawk-dove game’ article [105], the authors explored
the game by considering a finite number of agents who keep a record of past interac-
tions in their memory. The agents constantly update their probabilistic strategy by
weighting it toward the current optimal behaviour. Given a fixed memory length, m,
for each player in the game, agents use the bus-stop memory kernel. The authors first
investigated a non-mixed population where the agents have either a short or a long
memory and then explored a mixed population of short and long memory agents. In a
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non-mixed population, they found that when agents have a small memory, the system
possesses a stable fixed point, but having a long memory or update rate, destabilises
the fixed point which then creates a limit cycle via a Hopf bifurcation [120]. In a
mixed population, when the system is stable, agents with longer memories are more
accurate in determining the average hawk probability in the population. However,
when strategies oscillate it is no longer an advantage to have a long memory. Such
oscillations can either be a result of rapid strategy update rate, , or by a higher
number of agents with long memories. We will now extend these results to new types
of memory and then explore a new social dynamics model with memory.
Analysis
We are interested in exploring the behaviour of the dynamics of a population of
players using the ‘Hawk’ strategy and deriving analytically the point at which the
hawkish players start to change their strategies. In other words, we are interested in
the conditions that lead to the onset of oscillations whilst investigating the stability
of the state by considering the symmetric case.
The game is played by a group of L ≥ 2 agents who can recall a finite set of
past interactions, which they use to make decisions about their future behaviour.
Interactions take place via random pairing between agents at rate L
2
so that each agent
has one interaction per unit time on average. During the game, each agent possesses
some mechanism to estimate the strategies of their competitors. This enables them
to draw conclusions about the optimal strategy to execute. Their memory defines the
position of a random walker in the simplex
{
(#H,#D) ∈ N2| #H + #D = m}
with each new interaction determining the next step of the walk, where #H and #D
denote the number of hawk and dove encounters, respectively, in a player’s memory
of length m (total sum of moves (either ‘Hawk’ or ‘Dove’) played against the player’s
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previous opponents).
For player i, immediately before the k-th interaction, the number of occurrences
of H and D in the final m entries of the memory are expressed in the following
#H =
m∑
s=1
1[Mi(tk−s)=H] (2.2)
#D =
m∑
s=1
1[Mi(tk−s)=D], (2.3)
where Mi(tk−s) represents the move in the memory of player i at time t of her (k −
s)th interaction. At any given time, the times of past interactions may be sorted
t1, t2, t3, ..., tm where t1 is most recent and tm is furthest in the past. We define Mi(tj)
as
Mi(tj) =
 H if j-th interation is with H,D if j-th interation is with D.
The symbol 1[X] is the indicator for event X, defined as
1[X] =
 1 if X occurs,0 otherwise.
Note that in our analysis we distinguish between time t and interaction times between
players. Interactions arise as Poisson process with rate N
2
where N is a population
[121]. We will now elaborate on the different types of memory kernel that we will use
to determine how the contents of the final m entries of the memory change.
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2.1.1 Memory kernels: simulation results and analysis
An individual’s experience often shapes her choices [122]. An event can therefore
evoke different responses based on past experiences [123]. Learning and memory can
drive behaviours, including foraging behaviour. In this case, the ability to remem-
ber information, almost always leads to improved foraging success [124, 125]. The
way in which people or animals recall the same information is different [126]. Re-
searchers have shown that the different ways people and animals experience the past
are associated with distinct brain connectivity patterns that may be inherent to each
individual [127]. These life-long “memory traits” are the reason some people can
recall facts but little detail (semantic memory) while others have richly detailed rec-
ollections (episodic memory) [128]. In this part of the research, we introduce new
types of memory dynamics by thinking of memory kernels as set of pigeon holes.
Considering the ‘hawk-dove’ game, we are going to vary the way agents fill up the
pigeon holes.
Bus-stop memory kernel
In Figure 2.1 we show a representation of the way in which agents update their
memories after an interaction. Note that the bus-stop memory kernel is constant as
m m-1 1
Figure 2.1: Bus-stop memory
only one move is replaced in an agent’s memory after an interaction (see Figure 2.1).
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m s
μ(s)
Figure 2.2: Bus-stop memory kernel
We express the bus-stop memory kernel at time t as
µ(t) =

1
m
, if t ∈ [0,m]
0, otherwise
(2.4)
where m denotes the memory length.
At an interaction, each agent adopts either ‘Hawk’ or ‘Dove’, according to her
specific probabilistic strategy, φi(t) ∈ [0, 1], defined as the probability of agent i
adopting ‘Hawk’ at time t. We express the probabilistic strategy of player i adopting
strategy ‘Hawk’ and ‘Dove’ at her kth interaction as the following
(φi(tk), 1− φi(tk)) = (1−) (φi(tk−1), 1− φi(tk−1))+
{
(1,0) if #Hi(tk−1)
m
< 1
2
(0,1) if #Hi(tk−1)
m
> 1
2
where
tk is the time of the k
th interaction for player i. We have suppressed i dependence. In
the case where #Hi(tk−1)
m
= 1
2
player i makes a random choice between [1, 0] and [0, 1]
provided that m is even. The parameter #Hi(tk−1) denotes the number of hawks
encountered in player i’s memory of m interactions at time t which suggests that
φ¯i :=
#Hi(tk−1)
m
is player i’s estimate of the average strategy of other agents. The
parameter  ∈ [0, 1] describes the sensitivity of players to new information. In other
words,  is the ‘update’ or ‘learning’ rate which regulates how fast agents adapt to
change.
Each move (‘Hawk’ or ‘Dove’), has a probability weight associated with it. We
represent the average probability weight of ‘Hawk’ strategy in a group of size L at
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time t as
φ(t) =
1
L
L∑
i=1
φi(t). (2.5)
Letting V=2 and C=1, the equilibrium for both φ(t) is 1
2
. If φ(t) is constant then
the number of hawks and doves (#H(t),#D(t)) will be binomially distributed with
probability mass function where K denotes the number of hawks in a player’s memory
at time t, given by
P(#H(t) = K) =
(
m
K
)
φ(t)K(1− φ(t))m−K
=
m!φ(t)K(1− φ(t))m−K
K!(m−K)! .
(2.6)
We can approximate the probability mass function of #H by using the normal dis-
tribution, recall the probability density function of a normal distribution with mean
µ and variance σ2 is given by
n(x) =
1
σ
√
2pi
e
−(x−µ)2
2σ2 . (2.7)
The mean and variance for #H are given by
E[#H] = mφ(t) (2.8)
V[#H] = mφ(t)(1− φ(t)) (2.9)
which leads us to the normalized equation
P(#H(t) = K) w e
−(K−mφ(t))2
2mφ(t)(1−φ(t))√
2pimφ(t)(1− φ(t)) . (2.10)
Next, we want to find φ˙(t) in order to write a differential equation model of the
dynamics.
Let φ¯(t) be the average of φ(t) over the last m time steps, that is,
φ¯(t) =
1
m
∫ m
0
φ(t− s)ds. (2.11)
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We then denote the probability that a randomly selected player thinks it’s best to
play hawk by PH(φ¯(t)). We then have,
PH(φ¯(t)) = P
(
#H(t) <
m
2
)
=
∫ m
2
−∞
e
−(K−mφ¯(t))2
2mφ¯(t)(1−φ¯(t))√
2pimφ¯(t)(1− φ¯(t))dK
=
1
2
1 + erf
 1− 2φ¯(t)
2
√
2(1−φ¯(t))φ¯(t)
m

=
1
2
−
√
2
pi
√
mφ¯(t) +O
((
φ− 1
2
)3)
as φ→ 1
2
.
(2.12)
During the game an interaction may or may not occur between two players. Suppose
we have a population of size L, where φi(t + 1) denotes the probability that player
i plays ‘Hawk’ at time t + 1. We note that the probability of player i not being
picked in one round is L−2
L
which implies that the probability of being selected is 2
L
.
Player i’ s strategy can only be updated if a meeting occurs between her and another
player. In the case where a meeting occurs player i will play ‘Dove’ with probability
1 − PH(φ¯(t)) or play ‘Hawk’ with probability PH(φ¯(t)). The probability that player
i plays ‘Hawk’ at time t+ 1 can therefore be expressed as
φi(t+ 1) =

φi(t), w.p
L−2
L
(1− )φi(t), w.p 2L(1− PH(φ¯(t)))
(1− )φi(t) + , w.p 2L(PH(φ¯(t))).
(2.13)
Note that the abbreviation w.p means ‘with probability’. We approximate discrete
time with continuous time where one discrete step is equivalent to the interval ∆t
of continuous time. In our case we have ∆t = 2
L
. We express the change in the
probability of player i meeting a player playing ‘Hawk’ ∆φi(t+ 1) at time t+ 1 as
∆φi(t+ 1) =
−φi(t), w.p
2
L
(
1− PH(φ¯(t))
)
(1− φi(t)), w.p 2L
(
PH(φ¯(t))
)
.
(2.14)
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The expected change in φ(t+ 1) is therefore
E[∆φ(t+ 1)] =
2
L
[−φ(t)(1− PH(φ¯(t))) + (1− φ(t))PH(φ¯(t))]
=
2
L
(
PH(φ¯(t))− φ¯(t)
)
.
(2.15)
This leads us to the differential equation φ(t) (see equation (2.5))
dφ
dt
= (PH(φ¯(t))− φ(t)). (2.16)
We emphasize that this is the same equation to that in [105].
Linear Stability Analysis
In order to determine the critical condition for stability, we seek to linearise the
delay equation (2.16) around its fixed point. For simplicity, we set V = 1, C = 2,
and therefore the fixed point is φ∗ = V
C
= 1
2
. We introduce a function describing
fluctuations about this point
ψ(t) := φ(t)− φ∗ = φ(t)− 1
2
. (2.17)
Substituting 1
2
+ ψ(t) into our linearised differential equation (2.11) we obtain
φ¯(t) =
1
m
∫ t
t−m
φ(s)ds
=
1
m
∫ t
t−m
(
1
2
+ ψ(s)
)
ds
=
1
2
+
1
m
∫ t
t−m
ψ(s)ds
=
1
2
+ ψ¯(s).
(2.18)
Computing the derivative of ψ(t) by using Eq.(2.16) gives us
dψ
dt
= −
√
2
pi
√
m
m
∫ t
t−m
ψ(s)ds− ψ(t)
= −
[
ψ(t) +
√
2
pim
∫ t
t−m
ψ(s)ds
]
.
(2.19)
34
We want to know whether perturbations are stable at the fixed point
(
φ(t) = 1
2
)
.
Assuming that there exists a solution ψ(t) = eλt and using the solution into Eq.2.19,
we obtain
λeλt = −
[
eλt +
√
2
pim
∫ t
t−m
eλsds
]
(2.20)
λ = −
[
1 +
1
λ
√
2
pim
(1− e−λm)
]
(2.21)
which then leads to the characteristic equation
λ2 + λ+ 
√
2
pim
(1− e−λm) = 0. (2.22)
Writing λ = x + iy, we seperate the real and imaginary parts of the characteristic
equation as follows
x2 − y2 + x+ 
√
2
pim
e−mx cos(my) = 0 (2.23)
2xy + y − 
√
2
pim
e−mx sin(my) = 0. (2.24)
Numerical solution of these equations shows that with fixed memory length m the
real part, x, of the solution λ is negative when the value of  is sufficiently small.
Under these conditions the fixed point is stable in the sense that the system will
return to the fixed point after perturbation. As  increases past a critical value
instability appears when the real part, x, becomes positive. In this case oscillations
about the fixed point grow in amplitude. Numerical solution of the full non-linear
differential equation reveals that the amplitude of these oscillations is bounded giving
rise eventually to a ‘limit cycle’: oscillations of fixed amplitude. The transition from
stable fixed point to limit cycle is known as a ‘Hopf Bifurcation’ [120]. We want to
calculate the critical value of .
Substituting λ = x+ iy into ψ(t)
ψ(t) = ext[cos(yt) + i sin(yt)]. (2.25)
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Setting x = 0 in the imaginary part (2.24), we obtain
y − 
√
2
pim
sin(my) = 0. (2.26)
Rearranging (2.26) gives us
sin(my)
y
=
√
pim
2
. (2.27)
Expanding the left-hand side about y = pi
m
gives us
m(pi
2
− y)
pi
=
√
pi
2m
. (2.28)
Solving for y, we have y w pi
2m
(
2−
√
2pi
m
)
Substituting y into the real part gives us
−y2 + 
√
2
pim
cos(my) = 0
 = y2
(√
pim
2
cos(my)
)
.
(2.29)
We know that
y2 =
pi2
4m2
(
4− 4
√
2pi
m
+
2pi
m
)
=
pi2
m2
−
√
2
pi
5
2
m
5
2
+
pi3
2m3
.
(2.30)
For large m in cos
(
pi − pi
3
2√
2m
)
, 1√
m
is small. We can give a good approximation of
cos
(
pi − pi
3
2√
2
1√
m
)
at pi = pi
3
2√
2
1√
m
by using Taylor series about pi
3
2√
2m
, giving us
cos
(
pi − pi
3
2√
2
1√
m
)
= cos(pi)− pi
3
2√
2
(
pi − pi
3
2√
2m
)
sin(pi)− pi
3
2
2
√
2
(
pi − pi
3
2√
2m
)2
cos(pi)+... .
(2.31)
The value of critical  as m→∞ is therefore
 =
pi
5
2
2
√
2m
3
2
+
pi3
2m2
+
pi
7
2 (4 + pi2)
16
√
2m
5
2
+
pi6
16m3
+ ... . (2.32)
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Simulation results
Given a population of size L, we scale the number of steps for each calculation so that
L
2
pairings happen in one time unit. Suppose we let ∆t denote the time taken for each
pairing, we must have L
2
∆t=1 which implies that ∆t = 2
L
. We numerically simulate a
population of identical agents. Figure 2.3 shows the evolution of probability weight
φ(t) over time. The values for the update rate and memory are  = 5 × 10−3 and
m = 100 respectively. From the Figure, we can see that for short time, we observe
transient behaviours which decay over time. Running the system for longer time, we
find a stable state with small fluctuations.
Figure 2.3: Average simulated probability weight of hawk strategy for 1000 agents
(L = 1000) with V = 1, C = 2. All agents have memory m = 100 and update rate
 = 5× 10−3
In Figure 2.4 we have slightly increased the memory length (m = 150) and we
can see from the Figure that the increased memory length leads to stable oscillations.
Note that these oscillations first appear at a critical memory length which depends
on the value .
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Figure 2.4: Average simulated probability weight of hawk strategy for 1000 agents
(L = 1000) with V = 1, C = 2. All agents have memory m = 150 and update rate
 = 5× 10−3
In Figure 2.5 we show the average simulated weight of hawk strategy for a group of
size L = 200 with V = 1 and C = 2 as we vary the players’ memory lengths. We have
graphed the behaviour against t, where t goes from 0 to T . The different curves
represented in each diagram show the average simulated weight of hawk strategy
computed by using twenty different values of  equidistantly spaced within the range
0.005 6  6 0.015 (one simulation per  value). In other words, in each plot we have
displayed twenty graphs showing the average simulated weight of hawk strategy, one
for each  value. Note that in each plot we have varied the colours of the graphs.
From the graphs we can see that the system slowly reaches stability as we increase
the players’ memory lengths. The different graphs tell us that long memory agents do
not have an advantage over short memory agents as the system eventually stabilises.
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(a) m=1300 (b) m=2600
(c) m=3900 (d) m=5000
Figure 2.5: Average simulated probability weight of hawk strategy for 200 agents
(L = 200) computed by using twenty equidistantly spaced values between the range
0.005 and 0.15 (one simulation per  value). We have fixed V and C (V = 1, C = 2)
and varied the agents’ memory lengths.
In Figure 2.6, we show both the average simulated weight of hawk strategy and
the critical value of epsilon showing the dependence of the steady state amplitude of
φ(t) on . In both graphs, we have fixed , the number of players and the memory
length ( = 0.005, n=200 and m=200 respectively). The critical value of  has
been calculated by finding the average of the population over different runs but only
considering the second half mean values, which we have used to find the variance.
Here, critical  represents the stability of the fixed point (see equation (2.32)). The
graph is drew against epsilon of the time-variance in order to detect the onset of
cycles.
In Figure 2.7 we show the average simulated weight of hawk strategy over t by
keeping m and n fixed (m = 200, n = 200) whilst varying . From the graphs we can
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(a) Average simulated weight of hawk strategy
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²t
0.000
0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020
V
ar
(t
)[
φ
t]
Variance of φt with time, neglecting transients
(b) Critical epsilon
Figure 2.6: Average simulated weight of hawk strategy (left diagram) and dependence
of the steady state amplitude of φt on  for m=200, L = 200, V = 1 and C = 2.
see that the amplitude of the oscillations slowly decreases as we decrease the update
rate (). Varying the update rate with memory length fixed, , may therefore be
considered as a bifurcation parameter.
(a) =0.005 (b) =0.003
(c) =0.001 (d) =0.0005
Figure 2.7: Average simulated probability weight of hawk strategy in a group of size
L = 200 with V = 1, C = 2. All agents have memory length m = 200 and we vary
their update rate
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Similarly, Figure 2.8 shows us the transition from stable equilibrium to stable
oscillations. In this Figure, we show the average simulated weight of hawk strategy
over t by keeping  and L fixed ( = 0.005, L = 200) whilst varying the agents’
memory lengths, m. Again, we can say that m is a bifurcation parameter as varying
its value destabilises the fixed point.
(a) m=200 (b) m=800
(c) m=7000 (d) m=1500
Figure 2.8: Average simulated probability weight of hawk strategy in a group of size
L = 200 with V = 1, C = 2. All agents update their strategy with probability
 = 0.005 and we vary their memory lengths
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2.1.2 Exponential memory kernel
We express the exponential memory kernel at time t as
µ(t) = e−
t
m (2.33)
where m > 0.
Using the exponential memory kernel, each player effectively updates her memory
by replacing one of the moves in her current memory by the move observed from the
most recent player they interacted with. The positions of the moves in a player’s
memory are geometrically distributed such that the longer a move stays in a player’s
memory the more likely it will be replaced.
We want to analyse the exponential memory kernel since the geometric distribu-
tion essentially converges to the exponential distribution. We show that the geometric
distribution converges to the exponential distribution via moment generating func-
tions. The moment generating function for the geometric distribution is given by
MT (t, p) =
p
1− et(1− p) (2.34)
where p = λδt and t ∈ R.
lim
δt→0
MT (tδt, λδt) = lim
δt→0
λ
1
δt
− etδt ( 1
δt
− λ) (2.35)
= lim
δt→0
λ
1
δt
(1− etδt) + λetδt (2.36)
=
λ
λ− t (2.37)
Therefore, the moment generating functions of the geometric distribution converges
to the moment generating functions of the exponential distribution. Hence, δtT
converges in distribution to an exponential random variable with rate λ.
In Figure 2.9 we show a representation of the way in which a player’s memory is
updated after an interaction.
Figure 2.10 shows the average simulated probability weight of hawk strategy in a
group of size L = 200 with V = 1 and C = 2 as we vary the players’ memory lengths.
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new move old move
Figure 2.9: Exponential memory
The different curves represented in each diagram represent the average simulated
probability weight of hawk strategy, φt, computed by using twenty different values of
 equidistantly spaced within the range 0.005 6  6 0.015. For short time, we observe
transient behaviours which decay over a few times. This behaviour tells us that m is
not a bifurcation parameter as the system reaches stable equilibrium for any m value.
Varying  whilst keeping m fixed shows the same simulation results.
We want to prove analytically the stability of the average simulated probability
weight of hawk strategy observed in Figure 2.10. For simplicity, we shall only consider
the stability of the average simulated probability weight of hawk strategy over one
epsilon value. Recall that ψ represents some perturbation in a player’s memory. We
express the average of ψ at time t as
ψ¯(t) =
∫ t
−∞
e−
(t−s)
m
m
ψ(s)ds. (2.38)
Expressing the average change of ψ at time t
ψ˙(t) = −
[√
2
pim
∫ t
−∞
e−
(t−s)
m ψ(s)ds+ ψ(t)
]
. (2.39)
Let us assume that there exists a solution ψ(t) = eλt. Plugging this solution into
equation (2.39) gives us
λeλt = −
[√
2
pim
∫ t
−∞
e−
(t−s)
m eλsds+ eλt
]
(2.40)
= −
[√
2
pim
eλt(
λ+ 1
m
) + eλt] . (2.41)
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(a) m=50 (b) m=500
(c) m=1300 (d) m=2600
(e) m=3900 (f) m=5000
Figure 2.10: Average simulated probability weight of hawk strategy computed using
twenty equidistantly spaced values between the range 0.005 and 0.15 (one simulation
per  value). We consider a group of size L = 200 with V = 1, C = 2 as we vary their
memory lengths
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Rearranging the above and multiplying by λ+ 1
m
leads to the characteristic equation
λ2 + λ
(
1
m
+ 
)
+ 
[√
2
pim
+
1
m
]
= 0. (2.42)
Writing λ = x + iy , we separate the real and imaginary part of the characteristic
equation as follows
x2 − y2 + x
m
+ x+ 
√
2
pim
+

m
= 0 (2.43)
2xy +
y
m
+ y = 0. (2.44)
Letting y = 0 in the real part gives us
x2 + x
(
1
m
+ 
)
+ 
(√
2
pim
+
1
m
)
= 0 (2.45)
Rearranging (2.45) the above equation to find x we obtain
x =
− ( 1
m
+ 
)±√( 1
m
+ 
)2 − 4(√ 2
mpi
+ 1
m
)
2
. (2.46)
In order to show that the average probability weight of hawk strategy is stable when
agents use the exponential memory kernel we need to prove that x is negative. Note
that the quadratic equation (2.45) has two solutions where one of the solutions
x =
− ( 1
m
+ 
)−√( 1
m
+ 
)2 − 4(√ 2
mpi
+ 1
m
)
2
. (2.47)
is clearly negative. We now need to prove that
x =
− ( 1
m
+ 
)
+
√(
1
m
+ 
)2 − 4(√ 2
mpi
+ 1
m
)
2
. (2.48)
is also negative. We essentially want the following to hold:
1
m
+  >
√√√√( 1
m
+ 
)2
− 4
(√
2
mpi
+
1
m
)
. (2.49)
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Rearranging the above (2.49), we obtain
1
m
+  >
√√√√( 1
m
+ 
)2
− 4
(√
2
mpi
+
1
m
)
(2.50)
(
1
m
+ 
)2
>
(
1
m
+ 
)2
− 4
(√
2
mpi
+
1
m
)
(2.51)
0 > −4
(√
2
mpi
+
1
m
)
(2.52)
which tells us that x < 0; thus the average probability weight of hawk strategy is
stable. This result holds for any memory lengths and update rate. We can therefore
conclude that when agents possess an exponential memory kernel m and  are not
bifurcation parameters as they do not destabilise the fixed point.
2.1.3 Exponential and bus-stop memory kernels
Consider the case where agents update their memories by either using the bus-stop
memory kernel or the exponential memory kernel. The decision to choose between
the two memory kernels depend on the probabilities assigned to them.
We denote p to be the probability that an agent updates her memory using the
bus-stop memory and 1− p to be the probability that she updates her memory using
the exponential memory kernel. At each time step, a player uses one of the two
memory kernels.
In Figure 2.11 we show a representation of the way in which a player’s memory is
updated after an interaction.
We have simulated the average probability weight of hawk strategy by varying
the probabilities of using the bus-stop and exponential memory kernels. In Figure
2.12 we show the evolution of the average probability weight of hawk strategy for a
group of 200 agents (L = 200) where V = 1, C = 2 and m = 100. In each graph, we
have used twenty equidistantly spaced values between the range 0.005 and 0.15 (one
simulation per  value). From the graphs, we can see that the average probability
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Bus-stop memory kernel with probability p
Exponential memory kernel with probability 1-p
new move old move
1m m-1
m-1m 1
Figure 2.11: Representation of Bus-stop and exponential memory. Each agent up-
dates their memory using the bus-stop and exponential memory kernel with proba-
bilities p and 1− p respectively
weight of hawk strategy for all epsilon values between the range 0.005 and 0.15 is
more stable when the probability of using the bus stop memory kernel is small (e.g.
p = 0.2). Note that the smaller the probability of using the bus-stop memory the
bigger the probability of using the exponential memory kernel (1− p). We find that
the system destabilises at critical p. In the next section, we shall consider a new type
of game.
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(a) p=0.2 (b) p=0.4
(c) p=0.6 (d) p=0.8
(e) p=0.9 (f) p=1.0
Figure 2.12: Average simulated probability weight of hawk strategy using the bus-stop
memory kernel and exponential memory kernel. Using twenty equidistantly spaced
values between the range 0.005 and 0.15 (one simulation per  value), we consider a
group of size L = 200 with V = 1, C = 2 and m = 100
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2.2 Anticonformist dynamics with memory
While remembering information plays a role in changing a person’s opinion, the social
delivery of that information has the greatest effect [129]. Many studies in psychology
have shown that making people aware of the behaviour of others induces positive
behavioural change on a social level [130]. For example, people are more likely to
give to a charity if it is viewed as the social norm [131], householders decrease their
energy use when informed that they use more power than their neighbors [132, 133],
taxpayers are more likely to pay what they owe when knowing that others do [134].
Individuals often adjust their own attitudes and behaviors to match the majority’s
behaviour, known as social conformity [135]. The act of conforming is omnipresent in
social systems [136] and encompasses many specific mechanisms, including, conflict
avoidance, utility maximization, motivated reasoning and pursuit of positive relation-
ships, among others. However, in real societies a complete agreement is rather hardly
reached [137]. In recent years, other responses have been introduced to social influ-
ence into the opinion dynamics [138]. For instance, Galam introduced contrarians
[19, 139] into his models to fit into the anticonformity category. The contrarians con-
sciously deliberately challenge the position or actions of the group providing examples
of anticonformity [140]. Conformity and anticonformity can be applied to iterated
games such as the hawk-dove game. In this game, players remember a certain num-
ber of previous moves and can thus conform or not conform by basing their future
strategy on the analysis of those past encounters [141]. In this section, we explore the
anticonformist dynamics of the hawk-dove game by considering the non-spatial case.
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2.2.1 Model definition
Consider a population of L individuals, each of whom can use two types of strategies
(0 and 1). Let fi(t) be the probability that individual i uses strategy 1 at time t. In the
most general case, suppose that players are connected in a network with symmetric
adjacency matrix A. Each player makes decisions about their own behaviour based
on their memory τi of the frequency with which other players have used strategy 1.
These decisions are encoded in a response function
fi = P (τi) (2.53)
which gives the current behaviour f in terms of memory τ . We define the memory
as the average over remembered behaviour.
Let us consider two populations (A and B) with two different response functions
determining how conformist or anticonformist the subgroups are. We define the
response functions for the groups as follows
PA(τ) =
1
1 + e
τ−τ1
ξ
(2.54)
PB(τ) = 1− 1
1 + e
τ−τ2
ξ
(2.55)
where τ1 and τ2 denote the critical point at which the populations change their be-
haviour. Note that the bigger we make τ1 and τ2 the more people making the same/
opposite choice. The parameter ξ denotes the fraction of anticonformist agents. In
Figure 2.13 we show the response functions for a group of anticonformist (2.13a) and
conformist (2.13b) agents respectively. We can see that conformity and anticonfor-
mity may be treated as mirror images of each other [142]. Both reflect dependence
on the group, which is a positive reference group for conformity and a negative one
for anticonformtity [143].
In the hawk-dove game, the dynamics must be anticonformist in the sense that
dP (τ)
dτ
< 0. That is, if the number of players a particular player interacts with play
strategy 1 that player will behave less as type 1. We assume that the interactions
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0.6
0.8
1.0
PA
(a) Response function for anticonformists
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
τB
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
PB
(b) Response function for conformists
Figure 2.13: Response function for both anticonformist and conformist agents where
τ1, τ2 = 0.3 and ξ = 0.03 (see equations (2.54) and (2.55))
occur frequently over this time scale, so that players are able to accurately sample
the values of fi provided Aij = 1. Figure 2.14 shows a representation of five players
connected in a network with symmetric adjacency matrix
A =

a b c d e
a 0 1 0 1 1
b 1 0 0 1 1
c 0 0 0 1 0
d 1 1 1 0 0
e 1 1 0 0 0

to illustrate the meaning of Aij where i, j ∈ {a, b, c, d, e}
a b
c
d
e
Figure 2.14: Illustration of Aij where i, j ∈ {a, b, c, d, e}
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We equip players with memory kernel µ which takes the form of a probability
density with mean m (the memory length). We express the memory of player i in
terms of the convolution of the response function with the memory kernel, taking into
account the adjacency structure:
τi(t) =
1∑
j Aij
∫ t
−∞
∑
j
Aijfj(s)µ(t− s)ds. (2.56)
Writing g(f) = P−1(f) then differentiating our definition (2.56) of memory we obtain
∂tfi =
1
g′(fi(t))
∑
j Aij
(∑
j
Aijµ(0)fj(t) +
1∑
j Aij
∫ t
−∞
µ′(t− s)
∑
j
Aijfj(s)ds
)
.
(2.57)
In the next sub-section, we will investigate the non-spatial dynamics of the model.
2.2.2 Non-spatial (fully connected) dynamics
We begin by analysing a non-spatial version of the model in order to explore the
importance of the memory kernel µ. We define the average memory of the population
f(t) =
1
L
L∑
i=1
fi(t). (2.58)
If every player is connected to every other player, then as L→∞ all players have the
same memory so fi(t)→ f(t). In that case we have the following differential equation
f˙(t) =
1
g′(f(t))
(
µ(0)f(t) +
∫ t
−∞
µ′(t− s)f(s)ds
)
. (2.59)
As a concrete example suppose that our response function is
f = P (τ) =
(1−m)β
mβ + (1−m)β . (2.60)
Letting g(f) = τ , we have
g(f) = P−1(f)
=
(1− f)1/β
f 1/β + (1− f)1/β .
(2.61)
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We have a fixed point at f = 1
2
and
g′(1/2) = − 1
β
. (2.62)
Gamma memory kernel
Suppose that our memory kernel is the gamma distribution, that is,
µ(t) =

tke−t
γ(k+1)
, if t ∈ [0,m]
0, otherwise.
Then imposing
µ(t) = P−1(f) (2.63)
Let us arrive at our delay differential equation
f˙(t) =
1
g′(f(t))
∫ t
−∞
es−t(k + s− t)(t− s)k−1
Γ(k + 1)
f(s)ds. (2.64)
To determine the stability of the fixed point we use the trial solution f(t) = 1
2
+ eλt.
Substitution of this trial solution into equation (2.64) yields
λeλt = −β λe
λt
(1 + λ)k+1
(2.65)
so
(1 + λ)k+1 = −β (2.66)
and
λ = e
i(2n+1)pi
k+1 − 1 (2.67)
for L ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., k}. The largest real part of any of these roots occurs when n = 0
so the critical value of β is
βc(k) =
[
cos
(
pi
k + 1
)](k+1)
. (2.68)
For example, when k = 4
βc(4) =
1024
(1 +
√
5)5
≈ 2.885. (2.69)
We verify that this calculation is correct in Figure 2.15 and 2.16 which show solutions
to the delay equation when β is just above and just below the critical point.
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Figure 2.15: Solution to delay differential equation when the memory kernel is the
gamma distribution with k = 4 and β = 2.8.
Figure 2.16: Solution to delay differential equation when the memory kernel is the
gamma distribution with k = 4 and β = 3.0.
2.2.3 Solutions to the dynamics
We write our solution as a fluctuation about the fixed point
f(t) =
1
2
+ ψ(t) (2.70)
and define the memory operator via convolution with the memory kernel (refer back
to 2.1 for full definition)
Mˆf =
∫ ∞
0
µ(s)f(t− s)ds. (2.71)
Our dynamics may then be written
g(f) = Mˆf. (2.72)
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Suppose that β − βc is small, so oscillations are small. In that case we can replace g
with its Taylor series about f = 1
2
g(f) =
1
2
− 1
β
(
f − 1
2
)
(2.73)
=
1
2
− ψ
β
(2.74)
and our dynamics are
Mˆψ = −ψ
β
(2.75)
therefore fluctuations about the fixed point are eigenfunctions of the memory opera-
tor. Consider the trial function ψ(t) = sin(ωt). In the case of Gamma memory with
k = 4 for example we have
Mˆψ =
(5ω4 − 10ω2 + 1) sin(tω)− ω(ω4 − 10ω2 + 5) cos(tω)
(ω2 + 1)5
. (2.76)
Setting the coefficient of cos(ωt) to zero and solving for ω we find one of the solution
is
ω =
√
5− 2
√
5. (2.77)
Substituting this into (2.75) we find
Mˆψ = −(11− 5
√
5) sin(
√
5− 2√5t)
2(
√
5− 3) . (2.78)
The eigenvalue here turns out to be nothing other than − 1
βc(4)
. We have therefore
found that as β → β+c the solution to our dynamics approaches
f(t) =
1
2
+  sin(ωt) (2.79)
for some . Numerical experiments reveal that ω remains very close to its critical
value as we increase β, the amplitude grows and the shape of the solution changes
somewhat.
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2.2.4 Coupled oscillations
Consider two populations that are fully connected within themselves, and also coupled
together. We capture this cross-coupling as follows
g(f1) = (1− k12)Mˆf1 + k12Mˆf2 (2.80)
g(f2) = (1− k21)Mˆf2 + k21Mˆf1 (2.81)
where kij is the coupling of node i to node j. We initialize this system with each
population in an oscillatory state which would be a dynamical equilibrium of the
uncoupled systems. If the two oscillations representing the memory of the two popu-
lations (g(f1) and g(f2)) are out of phase then provided that the coupling is not too
strong, over time they will come to phase. We would like to understand the dynamics
of this phase change. If the coupling is weak then at any given time each population
will be close to its own dynamic equilibrium. If we are not too far from βc then we
can write the fluctuations of the two solutions
ψ1(t) = A(t) sin(ωt+ φ1) (2.82)
ψ2(t) = A(t) sin(ωt+ φ2). (2.83)
Simplest case
Suppose that k21 = 0 then
g(f1) = (1− k12)Mˆf1 + kMˆf2 (2.84)
g(f2) = Mˆf2. (2.85)
In terms of ψ1, ψ2 this is
ψ(t) = −β
(
(1− k12)Mˆψ1(t) + kψ2(t)
)
. (2.86)
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Since ψ2 is not coupled to ψ1 then
ψ2 =  sin(ωt) (2.87)
but ψ2 is
ψ1(t) = A(t) sin(ωt+ φ(t)). (2.88)
After numerically solving equation (2.84) we may determine the behaviour of the
phase φ(t) by inverting the above expression; giving us
φ(t) = sin−1
(
ψ1(t)
A(t)
)
− ωt. (2.89)
Note that φ is a function of t because it is changing.
Coupling between neighbours
Consider L players in a system where each player is connected with their neighbours,
and also coupled together. In Figure 2.17 we represent how the players are connected
with their neighbours.
Figure 2.17: Nodes on a line representing the connection between players. Each player
is connected to her nearest two neighbours (positioned on their left and right)
We write the cross-coupling of player i and j as follows
g(fi) = (1− kij)Mˆfi + kij
2
(
Mˆfj
)
(2.90)
g(fj) = (1− kji)Mˆfj + kji
2
(
Mˆfi
)
(2.91)
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where kij is the coupling of node i to node j. We have simulated the behaviour of the
average hawk strategy for a group of players as well as the phase difference between
oscillations. Figure 2.17 shows the behaviour of the probability of playing hawk for
each player at the beginning of the run and at the end of the simulation. We have
fixed the number of players (L = 10) and the coupling parameter (k = 0.01). From
the graphs, we can see that the players eventually come into phase. Although the
(a) Beginning of simulation (b) End of simulation
Figure 2.18: Average simulated probability weight of hawk strategy for group size
L = 10 at the beginning and at the end of the simulation with coupling k12 = 0.01,
frequency ω = 3.2
oscillations are out of phase at the beginning, the fact that the coupling was not
too strong and that there were only a few players, over time they came to phase.
In Figure 2.19 we show the phase difference at the beginning and at the end of the
simulation.
In Figure 2.20 the group size is changed to L = 100, and the behaviour of the
population remains unstable from the beginning to the end of the simulation.
After exploring different populations sizes, we discovered that there are three main
types of phase differences (see Figure 2.21).
In Figure 2.22 we show the behaviour of the phase difference between two phases
(φ1(t), φ2(t)) over time t as we increase the gap between their oscillations. The graphs
tell us that the bigger the difference in oscillations between the two phases the more
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(a) Beginning of the simulation (b) End of simulation
Figure 2.19: Phase difference between average simulated probability weight of hawk
strategy for group size L = 10 at the beginning of the simulation and once the system
has equilibrium
(a) Beginning of the simulation (b) End of simulation
Figure 2.20: Phase difference between average simulated probability weight of hawk
strategy for group size L = 100 at the beginning of the simulation and once the
system has equilibrium
anticonformist the players are. Since the oscillations show a similar behaviour to a
sine wave, we define the response function of two players (i and j) as follows
fi = A sin(ωt+ φi) (2.92)
fj = A sin(ωt+ φj) (2.93)
where A denotes the amplitude, ω the frequency, φi and φj denote the phases of fi
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(a) Stable (L = 10) (b) Unstable (L = 50) (c) Unstable (L = 100)
Figure 2.21: Phase difference between two oscillations as we increase the difference
betweeen their probabilities of playing hawk at the beginning of the game
(a) A (b) B (c) C
Figure 2.22: Phase difference between two oscillations as we increase the difference
betweeen their probabilities of playing hawk at the beginning of the game
and fj. Letting ψ represent the average of the integral of the squared of both response
functions (fi, fj) such that
ψ =
1
T
∫ T
0
A2 sin(ωt+ φi) sin(ωt+ φj)dt
≈ 2A2 sin2
(
φi − φj
2
)
.
(2.94)
where T denotes the time period. We computed the phase difference by rearranging
for φi − φj.
Coupling between subgroups: Connection to the Kuramoto Model
We point a possible connection 2.22 to a well known model of phase ordering. Syn-
chronisation is one of the most captivating cooperative phenomena in nature [144].
The topic of synchronisation has attracted the interest of scientists for centuries [145].
Synchronisation is observed in a variety of systems such as chemical, biological, phys-
ical and social systems [146]. Research on synchronisation phenomena focusses on
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determining the main mechanisms responsible for collective synchronous behaviour
among members of a given population [147]. We aim to evaluate the coupling between
two subgroups of a population and show the connection to the Kuramoto model [148].
The Kuramoto model [149] is one of the most popular mathematical models for
coupled oscillators used to describe synchronisation. Kuramoto models the oscillators’
phases to be dependent on scaled phase differences for all pairs of oscillators [150,
151]. The model makes several assumptions, including that the interactions between
oscillations depend sinusoidally on the phase difference between each pair of objects,
that there is a weak coupling and that the oscillations are identical or nearly identical
[152].
The model consists ofN coupled phase oscillators (ordinary differential equations),
φi, having natural frequencies ωi, distributed with a given probability density. The
dynamics for each oscillator’s phase φi is governed by
φ˙i = ωi +
N∑
j
kij sin(φj − φi), i = 1, ..., N (2.95)
where kij is a tensor.
Consider a population of L individuals divided into two subgroups. Introducing
the coupling strength, k ∈ [0, 1], each individual has n connections where (1− k)× n
is the number of connections within group and k × n is the number of connections
from the other group. During a game, each agent can use two types of strategies:
1 and 0 where 1 denotes the ‘H’ strategy and 0 denotes the ‘D’ strategy. In what
follows, we refer to these strategies as ‘states’.
Figure 2.23 shows an example of how the agents from two subgroups may connect
to one another. In this example, the agents are represented as circles and the lines
connecting one to another represents the connection between them. In other words,
a connection between two individuals represents an interaction between them.
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Subgroup 1 Subgroup 2
Figure 2.23: Connection between agents from two subgroups
When playing against their connections, a player keeps a record of the number
of 1 and 0 that she observes. The player then remembers her probability of playing
‘H’ which is equivalent to the total number of ones observed after playing against her
connections divided by her number of connections (n). The state of the player (0 or
1) depends on her recent probability of playing strategy 1.
Figure 2.24 shows the evolution of the probability of playing hawk for two sub-
groups of size L
2
, where L = 200, n = 20 and k = 0. The oscillations are out of phase
due to the subgroups being independent (k = 0). The likelihood of the oscillators
synchronising is higher as we increase the coupling k. In other words, sinusoidal
coupling favours synchronisation while distributed frequencies oppose it.
Figure 2.24: Phases of two populations with a total group of L = 200 where each
group consists of 100 agents. Each agent has n = 20 connections and the coupling
strength between the to oscillations is K = 0
In the next chapter, we will be exploring the movement patterns of agents who
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exhibit traplining behaviour as a way of foraging under competition and cooperation.
We will mainly explore two different types of trapline dynamics, Cross dynamics of
space use and an iterative model of trapline foraging.
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Chapter 3
Trapline Dynamics
In this chapter, we aim to use minimal statistical physics style models to explore
movement patterns of individuals while capturing their memory and interactions.
We also aim to explore how interactions between individuals determine space use.
How individual animals occupy and partition space has important consequences
for the dynamics and distribution of populations on a large scale [153, 154, 155, 156].
The ability to remember information is an essential skill that helps navigate one’s
environment efficiently [157, 158, 159]. Remembering details about previously visited
spatial resource patches reduces search time; thus improve the way animals forage
[160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165].
The spatial distribution of animals within a population depends on many factors
[166] such as landscape structure [167], social interaction [168] and depletion of re-
sources by individuals using the patches [169, 170, 171, 172]. Social interaction over
a common resource that is in limited supply often intensifies competition which then
leads to a change in the individuals’ fitness [163, 173, 174]. The competitive ability of
an individual is influenced by various factors such as age, growth rate, shape and size
[175, 176, 177]. There are three major forms of competition: interference competition,
exploitation competition and apparent competition [178].
An interaction is considered interference competition when an individual directly
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changes the resource-attaining behaviour of other individuals by interfering with for-
aging, survival and reproduction of others [179, 180, 181, 182]. An example of inter-
ference competition is the aggression display between competing organisms. Exploita-
tion competition occurs indirectly between individuals as they compete for common
resources (e.g. prey, territory, food) which acts as an intermediate [183]. One example
being ‘defence through depletion’ in which individuals who avoid direct conflict can
nonetheless defend their territory by timing their cycle visits to renewable resource
patches carefully in order to deplete the resource before the other party arrives [184].
Apparent competition also occurs indirectly but between victim species that arise
because they share a natural enemy [185]. Apparent competition occurs when an
increase in the abundance of one species leads to a decrease in the abundance of a
second species due to enhanced predation by a shared predator. In this thesis, we are
looking at exploitation competition whereby individuals compete for food with the
aim to maximise food consumption whilst minimising competition.
Competing for resources needed to survive often requires cooperation [158, 159].
We have explored two different types of trapline dynamics, one model more briefly
than the other. We shall refer to these two as ‘Cross dynamics of space use’ and
‘Iterative model of trapline foraging’. In the first type of trapline dynamics (‘Cross
dynamics of space use’), we are going to look at the evolution of strategies by means of
a learning process between interacting agents. In the second type of trapline dynamics
(‘Iterative model of trapline foraging’) we will be exploring an alternative which forms
the bulk of our work on trapline foraging. Before delving into the two models, we
shall introduce some mathematical structures which are common to both.
3.0.1 Common structures to both models
In each model, we consider a system consisting of L sites where each site is replenished
with food according to a renewal function, r(t). Given n players in the system, each
player has a trapline (sequence of m sites that she visits repeatedly). We represent a
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player’s trapline as a vector of length m
l¯ = (l(1), l(2), ..., l(m)) (3.1)
where l(k) ∈ 1, 2, ...,m is the site (food source) visited at the kth step. In Figure
3.1, we show two birds going through their traplines in a system consisting of four
flowers. The yellow bird’s trapline is represented as the yellow triangle and the blue
bird’s trapline is represented as the blue line. The positions of birds are updated
synchronously.
We introduce τi to be the last visit time at site i by any agent. Note that a player’s
trapline represents a strategy which could change over time. When a player’s trapline
changes, her average food gain fluctuates and then becomes periodic after a transient
period, assuming that other players do not change their traplines. We introduce the
periodic function L(t)
L(t) := l(t mod m) (3.2)
which gives the location of the player within her trapline (l¯) at time t.
When visiting a site (say i) at time t, a player eats all the accumulated resource,
Ei(t)
Ei(t) = r(t− τi). (3.3)
In the case of multiple players, n, found at site i at the same time we assume that
the amount of food is shared equally such that each player eats
Ei(t) =
r(t− τi)
n
. (3.4)
We introduce E¯ to be the average food gain of their lines
E¯ =
1
m
m∑
i∈l¯
Ei. (3.5)
For simplicity, we have suppressed t dependence in E¯ and Ei where i ∈ l¯. Note that
E¯ is a function of time which gives the average food gain of a player’s line at time t.
The different values of Ei where i ∈ l¯ indicate the most recent amount of food eaten
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(a) Stage 1 (b) Stage 2
(c) Stage 3
Figure 3.1: Two birds going through their lines in a system consisting of four flowers
by the player at each site in her line. We emphasize that a player eats food from each
site in her line at different times.
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3.1 Cross dynamics of space use
In this section, we explore a learning model developed in Bo¨rgers and Sarin [186]
where the behaviour of each individual agent is described in terms of a finite set of
pure strategies. In this scenario, each strategy is a trapline. We also explore the
Nash equilibrium by considering a two player game where we construct a random set
of traplines for each player representing the strategies in the game. We then play
the strategies of both players against each other until the system reaches equilibrium
(point at which players can no longer maximise their payoffs).
3.1.1 Dynamics: cross’s learning model
All forms of life exhibit some behaviour in response to the inputs that they receive
from the environment they exist in. Some people and animals change the way they
behave over time; given the same input, they may respond differently later on than
they did earlier on [187]. All behaviour change derives from the reinforcing effect of
instantaneous payoff experiences [188]. The ability to acquire behaviours is one of
the main components of people and animals’ culture; whose aim is usually to enhance
one’s quality of life [189]. Determining the ideal behaviour within a specific context
to maximise performance is known as reinforcement learning [186]. Reinforcement
learning is studied in many disciplines including game theory [190], optimisation
[191] and psychology [192]. This section considers a simple model of reinforcement
learning whereby two agents repeatedly play the same normal-form game and adjust
their strategies so as to maximise their payoffs.
In this model, the behaviour of each individual agent is described in terms of a
finite set of pure strategies. In our case, a strategy is represented as a trapline which
consists of m distinct sites from a system of size L. Henceforth, we shall refer to a
strategy as a trapline.
We define the sets of such traplines SX and SY for player X and player Y respec-
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tively
SX = {l¯1, l¯2, ..., l¯x}
SY = {l¯1, l¯2, ..., l¯y}
(3.6)
where SX and SY contain x and y distinct traplines respectively. At each point in
time, each player is characterised by a probability distribution over her trapline set
which indicates how likely she is to play any of her traplines [193]. We allow players
to play their traplines with some pre-assigned probabilities
−−→
x(t) = (x1(t), x2(t), ..., xnX (t))
−−→
y(t) = (y1(t), y2(t), ..., ynY (t)) .
(3.7)
The probabilities of each player adjust over time in response to the fact that the
player herself has chosen a particular trapline, and secondly to the average payoff
which she has received from her line. There are two timescales: the timescale of
players going round their lines and the timescale that players opt to choose a certain
strategy. We are assuming that timescale of strategy change is slow in comparison to
the rate of trapline traversal. In other words, the strategy choices change much more
slowly than the players moving round their lines so that the players have enough time
to determine how good their lines are. We note that a player determines how good
her line is based on the payoff that she receives from her line, E¯ (see equation (3.5)).
At each iteration of the game, each player uses one of her traplines and makes a
complete traversal of her line. Note that m time steps corresponds to one iteration of
the game. Given n iterations, we define the payoffs to X and Y for the whole learning
process when X plays i ∈ SX and Y plays j ∈ SY by
UXi,j =
n∑
k=1
E¯Xk (3.8)
UYi,j =
n∑
k=1
E¯Yk (3.9)
69
where n ∈ N, E¯Xk and E¯Yk denote the average food gain of players X and Y lines
at the kth iteration of the game. We normalise the payoffs of the players such that
UXi,j, U
Y
i,j ∈ [0, 1] for all X, Y , i and j.
The players play the game repeatedly. To construct a continuous time limit of the
learning model, we imagine that the amount of ‘real’ time that passes between two
repetitions of the game is given by a number  with 0 <  < 1. After each repetition of
the game, the players adjust the probability of playing each of their traplines. Given
trapline i in players X and Y trapline sets (SX , SY ), at time t + δt, the probability
of each player using trapline i is updated as follows
xi(t+ δt) = δiU
X
X(t),Y (t) +
(
1− UXX(t),Y (t)
)
xi(t)
yi(t+ δt) = δiU
Y
X(t),Y (t) +
(
1− UYX(t),Y (t)
)
yi(t)
(3.10)
where δi is the indicator of playing trapline i
δi =
1, if i ∈ SX , SY0, otherwise .
Considering the two player game, we constructed a set of random strategy sets
and we have evolved this dynamics starting from different initial conditions.
Let us now show and explain some simulation results for the dynamics of this
model. We first define the players’ normalised payoffs (UX , UY ) for a small and
large system whilst fixing m,SX , SY and n. We then introduce the concept of Nash
Equilibria and find out whether the optimal outcome of a game is one where no player
has an incentive to deviate from her chosen strategy after considering her opponent’s
choice.
Figure 3.2 represents a payoff matrix of two players (1 and 2) when using three
randomly selected traplines of length m = 4 in a system consisting of 4 sites (L = 4)
where each site k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}. In each blue cell of the matrix, the two numbers in
the brackets represent the payoffs received by players 1 and 2 respectively after using
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Figure 3.2: Two player game - payoff matrix representing the payoffs received by
two players (1 and 2) after n = 60 iterations. The system consists of 4 sites (L =
4) where each site k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}. The players have different strategy sets, S1 =
{(0, 2, 1, 3), (0, 1, 3, 2), (2, 1, 3, 0)} and S2 = {(2, 3, 0, 1), (2, 0, 1, 3), (3, 0, 1, 2)} where
each of the players’ traplines are of length, m = 4. We have put an asterisk symbol
(*) on top of the maximum payoff of player 1 and a plus sign symbol (+) on top of
the maximum payoff of player 2.
their lines (represented in the green cells). At each time step, each site in the system
is replenished with food according to a linear renewal function
r(t) = r(t− 1) + 2 (3.11)
where t represents the time. The players’ average payoffs from their lines are com-
puted by taking the average food gain over n = 60 iterations which is equivalent to
240 time steps since one iteration is equal to m time steps.
Consider two competing lines of players 1 and 2 from figure (3.4)
l¯1 = (0, 2, 1, 3) and l¯2 = (2, 3, 0, 1) (3.12)
In Figure 3.3 we show a representation of how the food at each site in the system and
the payoffs received by each player when using lines l1 and l2 (3.12) are updated at
each time step. The payoffs shown in figure 3.2 are calculated by taking the average
total payoffs of all sites in the players’ lines. For instance, the average payoffs of
players 1 and 2 shown in the payoff matrix when using lines l¯1 = (0, 2, 1, 3) and
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Figure 3.3: Representation of food replenishment at each site in the system and total
payoffs received by players (1 and 2) at each site in their line. The system consists of
4 sites (L = 4) where each site k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}. Players are using different traplines
((0, 2, 1, 3) and (2, 3, 0, 1)) of length, m = 4.
l¯2 = (2, 3, 0, 1) are computed by taking the average of the total payoffs of their lines
(see Figure 3.3), (240, 118, 359, 243) (for player 1) and (363, 236, 241, 120) (for player
2). We ran each simulation twenty times in order to ensure that the payoffs received
by the players were equivalent in all simulations.
We normalise the payoffs shown in Figure 3.2 by dividing each payoff value by the
maximum payoffs received by each player. Note that we have put an asterisk symbol
(*) on top of the maximum payoff of player 1 and a plus sign symbol (+) on top of
the maximum payoff of player 2 (see figure 3.2). We obtain the normalised payoff
matrix in figure 3.4 such that
U1i,j ∈ (0, 1) and U2i,j ∈ (0, 1) (3.13)
From figure 3.4, the system size is small and the players’ lines consist of all the
sites in the system which means that the players share all of their sites. However, the
visit times at the sites may differ based on how long the sites had been left unvisited.
When a player visits a site (say i) in her line the payoff she receives from the site
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Figure 3.4: Two player game - Payoff matrix representing the normalised payoffs
received by two players (1 and 2) after n = 60 iterations. The system consists of 4
sites (L = 4) where each site k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}. The players have different strategy sets,
S1 = {(0, 2, 1, 3), (0, 1, 3, 2), (2, 1, 3, 0)} and S2 = {(2, 3, 0, 1), (2, 0, 1, 3), (3, 0, 1, 2)}
where each of the players’ traplines are of length, m = 4.
depends on the last visit time at the site, (τi) by any agent. The subsequent time visit
between any agent at site i and a player arriving at the site is therefore an important
parameter which determines the payoff, r(t − τi), that the next player arriving at
the site (at time t) will receive. Having a small system is therefore disadvantageous
to the players as they often share sites and do not let enough time for the sites to
be replenished with food. In Figure 3.5, we emphasize the disadvantage of sharing
sites in the diagonal of the normalised payoff matrix. Looking at figure (3.5), we can
see that the players share all of their sites when using the same traplines and their
payoffs are therefore affected by their shared sites. In this example, the players visit
the sites at the same time; thus they obtain equal payoffs from their lines.
3.1.2 Expected number of Nash equilibria: random strategy
sets
In game theory, a player’s dominant strategy is considered to be better than other
strategies, no matter what her opponents may play [194]. There are two kinds of
strategic dominance: Strictly dominant strategy and Weakly dominant strategy. A
strictly dominant strategy is a strategy that always provides greater utility to a player,
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Figure 3.5: Two player game - Payoff matrix representing the payoffs received by
two players (1 and 2). The system consists of 12 sites (L = 12) where each site
k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12}. The players have the same strategy sets, S1, S2 =
{(1, 2, 3, 4), (5, 6, 7, 8), (9, 10, 11, 12)} where each of the players’ traplines are of length,
m = 4. The game is played over n = 100 iterations such that the players obtain their
maximum payoff value after using each of their lines
no matter what the other player’s strategy may be [195]. A weakly dominant strategy
is a strategy that provides at least the same utility for all the other player’s strategies,
and strictly greater for some strategy [196].
A set of strategies is a Nash equilibrium if neither player can improve their payoff
by changing their own strategy (against the opponent’s fixed strategy). If every player
has a dominant strategy, then the outcome will be a Nash equilibrium. We note that
any dominant strategy equilibrium is always a Nash equilibrium but not all Nash
equilibria are dominant strategy equilibria.
Given a set of strategies for each player we can construct a payoff matrix to
represent the payoffs received by the players after playing each of their strategies.
From this payoff matrix we can find out whether there are any Nash equilibria. We
note that in our case a player’s strategy is represented by a trapline.
In Figure 3.6, we show an example of a payoff matrix representing the payoffs
received by two players when playing against each other. The payoff of one line
against the other is the food gain per step once the system has reached equilibrium.
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Figure 3.6: Payoff matrix representing the payoffs received by two players (1 and
2) after playing their strategies against each other in a system consisting of 50 sites
(L = 50). Each player has three strategies where each strategy is of length m = 4.
The Nash equilibria payoffs are representing in the yellow cells
We represent the players strategy sets (S1, S2) as follows
S1 = {(4, 10, 23, 30), (19, 8, 16, 40), (9, 5, 23, 30)} (3.14)
S2 = {(9, 5, 23, 30), (19, 8, 16, 40), (12, 39, 22, 2)}. (3.15)
In the payoff matrix, the green cells represent the different strategies (traplines) for
both players (1 and 2) and the yellow cells represent the players’ Nash equilibria
payoffs. Looking at the Nash equilibria payoffs received by both players when player
1 plays strategy (4, 10, 23, 30) against player 2 playing strategy (19, 8, 16, 40) we can
see that player 1 receives the best payoff when using trapline (4, 10, 23, 30) against
player 2’ trapline (19, 8, 16, 40). Similarly, player 2 receives the best payoff when using
trapline (19, 8, 16, 40) against player 1’ trapline, (4, 10, 23, 30). Since neither player
can improve their payoff by changing their own strategy (against the opponent’s fixed
strategy) among the lines in their available strategy sets we can say that the payoffs
they receive when using their strategies ((4, 10, 23, 30) against (19, 8, 16, 40)) are Nash
equilibria payoffs. The same logic applies for the Nash equilibria payoffs in the other
yellow cells.
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3.1.3 The importance of correlation in random games
Consider two players (1 and 2) in a system consisting of L sites where player 1 and
player 2 have trapline lengths m1 and m2 respectively. The correlation between the
two players is computed as a function of trapline lengths, m1, m2 and system size
L. In our model, we find that the payoffs of the players corresponding to a given
profile of strategies will be correlated and that correlation has a significant effect on
the expected number of Nash equilibria.
When the system size is small, we expect the players’ lines to be crowded as
players will be forced to share sites. Mathematically this will be reflected in negative
correlation between food payoffs obtained from randomly selected lines. The players
will ultimately keep changing their lines as a way of improving their payoffs. As a
result, it will be less likely to find any Nash equilibria payoffs as the definition of
Nash equilibria payoffs in this context means that neither player has anything to gain
by changing their lines. Correlation is also negative if one player has a longer line
in comparison to the other player. When this occurs, the player with the longer line
will do well since she will have a higher payoff in comparison to the other player.
Consequently, the player with the shorter line would want to change her line because
she will be more likely to improve her payoff by using a different line.
On the other hand, if the system size is big in comparison to the players’ lines
the players can have entirely separated lines which means that they will gain the
maximum payoff from the sites in their lines. The players’ payoffs will therefore
tend to be positively correlated. Also, we have a positive correlation if the payoffs
received by the players are simultaneously high or low. Note the more different
strategies available to the players the higher the correlation as there will be many
Nash equilibria payoffs.
In Figure 3.7, we show the expected number of Nash equilibria between the
payouts of two players after playing each of their traplines from their set of n traplines.
Each trapline consists of m randomly selected sites from a system of size 100 (L =
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100). We show the expected number of Nash equilibria payouts as we increase the
length of the agents’ traplines. Thinking of each trapline as a strategy, for each
trapline length we generated n × n payoff matrices representing the payoffs of two
players when playing each of their strategies against each other. The payoff of one line
against the other is the food gain per step once the system has reached equilibrium.
For each payoff matrix we discarded the initial transient behaviour and recorded the
average food gain per trapline step. We then counted the number of Nash equilibria
averaged over many strategy sets of size n.
From the graph we can see that the number of Nash equilibria decreases as we
increase the players’ trapline lengths. This is due to the players sharing more sites
which results in fewer dominant strategies. For a small number of strategies there are
still some Nash equilibria because different traplines can be made from the sites in
the system. The generalisation of the game to one or more than two players displays
qualitatively the same graphs.
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Figure 3.7: Relationship between the expected number of Nash equilibria as we vary
the players’ trapline lengths (m). The system size, L and the number of traplines in
the players’ strategy sets are fixed (L = 100, n = 6)
3.1.4 When is a system stable?
Applying the cross learning process to the two player game enables us to see whether
the system reaches stability. In other words we want to know whether the optimal
outcome of a game is one where no player has an incentive to deviate from her chosen
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strategy after considering her opponent’s choice. One way to investigate whether a
system reaches stability is to observe how the probabilities of each individual player’s
strategy change over time. In Figure 3.8 we show the probabilities of two players
selecting each of their five different strategies of length m = 10 at the beginning of
the simulation and when the system has reached stability. The players’ lines consist
of sites from a system of size L = 100. After many iterations the players eventually
stick to one strategy. In this example, there were no Nash equilibria payoffs. The
result obtained is consistent with the lack of Nash equilibria.
(a) Beginning of the simulation (b) End of simulation
Figure 3.8: Probabilities of two players selecting each of their traplines at the be-
ginning and at the end of the simulation. The players have the same strategy set,
S, where each of their strategies consist of 10 sites (m = 10) from a system of size
L = 100.
In Figure 3.9 we show the evolution of the probabilities of two players using the
same parameter values as the ones used in Figure 3.8. In this Figure we can see the
point at which the players stick to a particular strategy. Also, notice how the players
no longer consider using any other strategies as the probability of choosing them is
zero.
The simulation results tell us that the players can use a particular strategy without
ever changing it. This behaviour is less natural because the players are not able
to occasionally change their strategies by building their lines iteratively. For many
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Figure 3.9: Evolution of the probabilities of two players selecting each of their
traplines. Both players have the same strategy sets S where each of their strate-
gies consist 10 sites (m = 10) from a system of size L = 100.
humans and animals, a change in behaviour can potentially improve an individual’s
prospects of surviving and reproducing in a changing world [197]; hence we would
expect players to be able to change their strategies.
We have learnt that the dynamics of the cross learning dynamics model is less
natural since the players may not always be able to adapt their strategy. Nevertheless,
the concept of Nash equilibrium can be applied for learning the game structure and
the agents’ strategies. We are now going to explore an iterative model of trapline
foraging whereby players can adapt their strategies by adding a new site to their lines
or removing one of their sites.
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3.2 Iterative model of trapline foraging
After exploring the ‘Cross dynamics of space use’ we wanted to look at the idea
of traplining in a different way. In this model, we assume that a player changes
her trapline by adding a site to her line or removing one of her existing sites (in
her current line). We shall use this model in order to explore and understand the
dynamics of a population of trapliners. For simplicity we shall consider the case of
pollinators and refer to them as ‘agents’ or ‘players’. We will first look at the fully
connected topology where every site in the system is connected to every other site.
Next, we will explore the two dimensional case where a system is represented as an
L× L matrix such that each element in the matrix represents a site in the system.
3.2.1 Fully connected topology
Given n players in a system consisting of L sites, each player builds up her trapline
by adding a new site to her line or removing one of her existing sites in her current
trapline. The length of a player’s trapline thus changes over time.
Nectar Replenishment in flowers
A flower produces nectar according to a concave renewal function, r(t)
r(t) =
1− e−λt
λ
(3.16)
which is a linear increase toward a maximum value beyond which nectar at a site
does not increase. In Figure 3.10 we show a representation of nectar accumulation at
a site, where λ = 0.01 affects how rapidly the amount of nectar is produced. From
the graph we can see that nectar reaches a maximum level proportional to 1
λ
.
When resource renewal is non-linear the systematically scheduled revisitation min-
imises variation in elapsed time between visits which in turn reduces the time that a
site spends not renewing [80]. Note that nectar in a site is determined by the resource
renewal rate λ, elapsed time since site was last visited τ and the maximum resource
abundance per patch 1
λ
.
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Figure 3.10: Renewal function (λ=0.01)
Pollinators respond to changes in profitability of sites by adjusting the visitation
rate to maximise their food consumption [198, 199, 69, 200]. In a competitive envi-
ronment a trapliner cannot reduce variation in elapsed time between visits on shared
sites. However, as a trapline often spreads widely in space a trapliner can maintain a
low variability of elapsed time between visits to her non-shared sites [69, 79, 201].
Moving Step
At each time step, each player decides whether to
1. Visit a new candidate site, consider adding it permanently w.p. α.
2. Visit the usual next site, consider removing it w.p. (1− α).
3. Visit the usual next site without considering a change w.p. 1− 
where  ∈ [0, 1] is the evolution rate, α ∈ [0, 1] is the expansion rate and the ab-
breviation w.p. means ‘with probability’. Note that as  → 0 a player spends more
time going through her line before permanently adding a new site or rejecting it for
future traversals. We also note that a realistic feature of the model is that players
do not have access to information about remote sites; a player must visit a site (and
consume the resource there) in order to gauge the possible benefit of adding the site
to further trapline traversals.
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Decision Making
A player visits site (say i) at time t and eats all the accumulated resource, Ei
Ei = r(t− τi) (3.17)
where τi is the last visit time at site i by any player. This assumption is frequently
adequate for nectarivores visiting individual flowers [202], although in other cases,
foragers may leave residual resource behind. In the case of multiple birds visiting
the same site at the same time, we have assumed that the amount of food available
is shared equally. For simplicity, we assume that the depletion process is effectively
instantaneous compared with the time scale of renewal, that is the time spent at a
resource patch is invariably zero [80].
After eating the amount of food at a site, each player decides whether to make
a change to her line. Their decision is based on their line expansion rate α and the
difference between their average food gain, E¯ and the amount they have just eaten
from the site they are currently visiting, Ei
∆E = Ei − E¯ (3.18)
where
E¯ =
1
m
m∑
i∈l¯
Ei. (3.19)
We introduce β to be the decision temperature representing the decisiveness of
a player. As β → ∞, decisions are either 0 or 1 and there are perfectly rational
responses to ∆E which means that a player makes the perfect decision. However,
as β → 0 the decision making is totally random as the probabilities of adding and
removing a site (3.20, 3.21) goes to half. We express the probability of a player doing
a further consideration of adding a new site to her line as
Pexpand =
1
2
[
1 + tanh(β∆E)
]
(3.20)
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and the probability of doing a further consideration of rejecting a site as
Pshrink =
1
2
[
1− tanh(β∆E)] (3.21)
We note that equations 3.20 and 3.21 are applied after the players have decided to
try an expansion (or a contraction).
In Figure 3.11 we show a representation of the evolution of the probabilities of
adding and removing a site for different β values as we vary the energy difference
(∆E) in the range -10 to 10. From the graphs we can see that when β = 0 a player
adds and remove sites irrespective of energy difference. In other words, a player adds
a site with probability 0.5 and removes a site with probability 0.5. However, as we
increase β a player makes the perfect decision as the probability of being certain that
a site is either good or bad tends to 1.
Figure 3.11: Evolution of probabilities of considering an expansion (α) and a con-
traction (α(1− )) as we vary β.
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3.2.2 Simulation results
In this section, we show and describe some of the results that we have obtained from
the Iterative model of trapline foraging. We have looked at both the one player and
two player game and produced some analytical results to match our observations.
One player game
Understanding the behaviour of one single player in a system is useful as it can give us
a lot of information about how the player makes use of the system. After implementing
the Iterative model of trapline foraging in Python, we first started by collecting some
statistics to help us understand the behaviour of a single player in a system whilst
varying the system size (L) and the decisiveness of the bird (β). In Figure 3.12
we show the evolution of a single player’s line length in a system by varying the
decisiveness of the player, β. We assume that the players are not allowed to add sites
that they already have in their lines (i.e. may not make multiple visits to a particular
site within a single trapline traversal). In each graph, we have considered a system
of size 100 (L = 100) and each site in the system is replenished with food according
to the concave renewal function 3.16 where λ = 0.01. We shall stick to L = 100
and λ = 0.01 for the remainder of the thesis unless we say otherwise. In all four
sub-figures, the player considers a line change with probability 0.005 ( = 0.005) and
an expansion with probability 0.8 (α = 0.8). The red dashed horizontal line in each
graph indicates the system size. From the graphs we can see that the player always
ends up using all sites in the system. However, when β = 0 the player takes a bit
longer to possess all sites in the system. This is due to the fact that she permanently
adds a new site to her line with probability 0.5 and irrespective of energy difference
she removes a site with probability 0.5.
Using the same parameter values as the ones used to produce the graphs in Figure
3.12, we show the moving average of the player’s food gain (Figure 3.13) as we vary β.
From the graphs we can see that the player’s average food gain reaches a constant level
proportional to the renewal function evaluated at the player’s constant line length,
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(a) β=0 (b) β=0.05
(c) β=1 (d) β=10
Figure 3.12: Evolution of a single player’s line length for different β values. In each
sub-figure, we consider a player in a system of size, L = 100, where the player considers
a line change with probability  ( = 0.005), an expansion with probability α = 0.8
and a contraction with probability 1− α = 0.2.
100 as it takes the player 100 time steps to gain the maximum out of each site in her
line
r(100) =
1− e−1
0.01
(3.22)
≈ 63.21 (3.23)
In Figure 3.14, we show the evolution of a single player by varying the system size
(50, 100, 200, 400) whilst keeping β,  and α fixed (β = 10,  = 0.005, α = 0.8). From
the graphs we can see that the bigger the system size the longer it takes the player
to use all sites in the system.
In Figure 3.15 we show the corresponding Figures for the moving average food
gain. Again, we find the player’s constant average food gain by evaluating the renewal
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(a) β=0 (b) β=0.05
(c) β=1 (d) β=10
Figure 3.13: Evolution of a single player’s moving average for different β values. In
each sub-figure, we consider a player in a system of size, L = 100, where the player
considers a line change with probability  ( = 0.005), an expansion with probability
α = 0.8 and a contraction with probability 1− α = 0.2.
function at their maximum and constant line length, L.
Although our simulation results can help us visualise and predict the behaviour
of a single player in a system, it is also important to match our observations with
analytical results. The analytical and simulation results provide a check on each other
and analytics give better intuition about what is going on. We start our analysis by
finding the equation representing one single player’s line length after the system in
which the player is in has reached equilibrium.
Letting l be her constant line length, we assume that the player is very decisive
(β is large) and always makes the perfect decision. We deduce:
 Probability of adding a new site: α(L−l)
L
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(a) L=50 (b) L=100
(c) L=200 (d) L=400
Figure 3.14: Evolution of a single player’s line length when the system size is varied
(L = 50, 100, 200, 400) whilst β,  and α are fixed. In each sub-figure, the player
considers a line change with probability  ( = 0.005), an expansion with probability
α = 0.8 and a contraction with probability 1− α = 0.2.
 Probability of removing a site: α(1−)
2
where α is the probability of considering an expansion and L−l
L
is the fraction of sites
that the player does not have in her line; thus a player adds a new site to her line with
probability α(L−l)
L
. A player considers a contraction with probability α(1 − ) and
irrespective of energy difference she removes any of her sites with probability 1
2
. For
the purpose of this analysis we shall assume that the sites that are not in the player’s
line have more food than the player’s average food gain. We express the expected
change in the player’s line length as the difference between the probability of adding
a site
(
α(L−l)
L
)
and the probability of removing a site
(
α(1−)
2
)
E[∆l] = α
(
1− l
L
)
− (1− α)
2
. (3.24)
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(a) L=50 (b) L=100
(c) L=200 (d) L=400
Figure 3.15: Evolution of a single player’s moving average when the system size is
varied (L = 50, 100, 200, 400) whilst β,  and α are fixed. In each sub-figure, the player
considers a line change with probability  ( = 0.005), an expansion with probability
α = 0.8 and a contraction with probability 1− α = 0.2.
In order to consider equilibrium we set the expected change in the player’s line length
equal to zero
α
(
1− l
L
)
−  (1− α)
2
= 0. (3.25)
Rearranging the above equation for l enables us to find the equation representing the
line length of one single player in a system after the system has reached equilibrium.
α
(
1− l
L
)
=
 (1− α)
2
1− l
L
=
 (1− α)
2α
l
L
= 1−  (1− α)
2α
l = L
(
1− 1− α
2α
)
.
(3.26)
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Example: Suppose we have a single player in a system consisting of 100 sites
(L=100); where =0.07 and α = 0.71. Assuming that β is large we find the player’s
line length after the system has reached equilibrium by plugging in the parameter
values mentioned into equation 3.26.
l = 100
(
1− 0.29
1.42
)
(3.27)
≈ 80 (3.28)
We shall now match the above result (l ≈ 80) with our simulation result where
we simulate the evolution of a single player’s line length using the same parameter
values as the ones used in the above example (L = 100,  = 0.07, α = 0.71).
In Figure 3.16, we compare the solution of the differential equation dl
dt
= E[∆l]
using the Runge-Kutta Method fourth order (sub-figure 3.16a) to the python simula-
tion showing the evolution of the player’s line length (sub-figure 3.16b). From the two
Figures (3.16a, 3.16b) we can see that the Runge-Kutta Method fourth order gives us
a very good approximation of the evolution of the player’s line length.
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(a) Fourth-order Runge-Kutta Method
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(b) Python Simulation (β = 200)
Figure 3.16: Solution to the differential equation dl
dt
= E[∆l] using the Runge-Kutta
Method fourth order to the python simulation showing the evolution of one single
player’s line length in a system of size, L = 100. The player considers an expansion
with probability α=0.05, a contraction with probability (1 − α)=0.02 and neither
with probability (1− )=0.97.
In Figure 3.17, we have superimposed the two graphs (3.16a, 3.16b) to show how
accurate both results are to our analysis. The blue line shows the solution to the
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differential equation dl
dt
= E[∆l] using the Runge-Kutta method and the black lines
show the different results obtained from our simulation.
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Figure 3.17: Superimposition of the solution to the differential equation dl
dt
= E[∆l]
using the Runge-Kutta Method fourth order and the python simulation showing the
evolution of one single player’s line length in a system of size, L = 100. The player
considers an expansion with probability α=0.05, a contraction with probability (1−
α)=0.02 and neither with probability (1 − )=0.97. Note the black lines show the
different results obtained from our simulation
3.2.3 Two player game
How cooperative or uncooperative players are is determined by their line expansion (or
evolution rate), α. For simplicity, we classify players in two categories: ‘Expanders’
and ‘Shrinkers’.
A player is considered to be a shrinker when her line expansion rate is greater
than zero and less or equal to 0.5 (0 < α 6 0.5). On the other hand, we consider
a player to be an expander if her line expansion rate is greater than 0.5 and less or
equal to 1.0 (0.5 < α 6 1.0). The more expansive a player is the more often she tries
out new sites and therefore overlap with others. Expanders tend to have longer lines
than shrinkers as they often add sites to their lines. We can relate the behaviour of
traplining foragers to the prisoner’s dilemma [20] and the hawk-dove game [203].
The prisoner’s dilemma game has some similarities with the hawk-dove game.
The players who choose to defect in the prisoner’s dilemma game can be seen as
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hawkish players and the players who choose to cooperate can be seen as Dovish
players. Expanders have in fact a similar behaviour to hawkish players as they share
most of their sites with other players suggesting that hawkishness is the propensity to
cheat by nicking bits from other people’ territories. We want to understand traplining
foraging in the context of the hawk-dove and the prisoner’s dilemma games by using
the Iterative model of trapline foraging.
In Figures 3.18, 3.19, 3.20 we show the evolution of two players’ line lengths, non-
shared sites and trapline overlap by varying the players’ line expansion rate whilst
keeping their probability of considering a change fixed ( = 5 × 10−4). From the
graphs, we can see that the more expansive the players are the longer their lines.
Also, notice how there is no overlap for small α value (α = 0.10) as the players have
very short lines and can therefore easily avoid each other. However, as we increase α
the players’ overlapping region increases until the players eventually use all the sites
in the system; thus end up sharing all of their sites (3.20c, 3.20d).
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0 200000 400000 600000 800000 1000000 1200000 1400000
Time
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Li
ne
 L
en
gt
h
Line Length evolution
(c) α = 0.70
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(d) α = 1.0
Figure 3.18: Evolution of two players’ line lengths in a system consisting of size
L = 100. We have varied the players’ line expansion rate, α and fixed the probability
of the players considering a line expansion rate  = 5× 10−4.
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(a) α = 0.10
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(b) α = 0.40
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(c) α = 0.70
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(d) α = 1.0
Figure 3.19: Evolution of two players’ non-shared sites and trapline overlap in a
system consisting of size L = 100. We have varied the players’ line expansion rate, α
and fixed the probability of the players considering a line expansion rate  = 5×10−4.
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Figure 3.20: Evolution of two players’ trapline overlap in a system consisting of size
L = 100. We have varied the players’ line expansion rate, α and fixed the probability
of the players considering a line expansion rate  = 5× 10−4.
3.2.4 The disadvantage of overlapping
In this sub-section, we shall prove that given any concave renewal function sharing
a region with one or more individuals is worse than having separate regions. Our
hypothesis is that concave renewal implies that separate ranges are optimal. We
experimented the case of two players in a context of an actual game to see whether
the players’ gain of food is able to optimise when they stop sharing sites. There are
two classic games to which we are linking this to: The prisoner’s dilemma [204] and
the hawk-dove game [205].
Theorem 1. Given a concave renewal function, sharing a region with one or more
individuals is worse than having separate regions.
When applying the convexity theorem, the players are actually playing a prisoner’s
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dilemma game and their behaviour can also be compared to players playing the hawk-
dove game. To illustrate how a concave renewal function leads to lower rates of
energy gain when home ranges overlap, we consider two players (X and Y ) in a fully
connected system consisting of L sites where each site in the system is replenished
with food according to a concave renewal function, 3.16. Assuming that L is even and
that the players have identical home range sizes (x, y), we consider the symmetric case
y = L− x such that in the long run average rate of energy gain for pairs of traplines
formed from symmetric home range sizes is greatest when x = L
2
.
Proof. Let g(x) be the long term gain of either player. In order to prove that the
players’ average food gain decreases as soon as they start sharing sites, we need to
prove that g′(x)<0 when x>L
2
. We express the energy gain per unit time as
g(x) :=
r(x), if x ≤
L
2(
L−x
x
)
r(x) +
(
2x−L
x
)
1
x
∫ x
0
r(s)ds, if x > L
2
(3.29)
where 2x−L
x
and L−x
x
represent the fraction of time that a player spends in the overlap-
ping and non-overlapping regions respectively. Treating x as a continuous variable,
and differentiating with respect to x we have for x > L
2
g′(x) =
2
x
(
L
x
− 1
)[
1
x
∫ x
0
r(s)ds−
(
r(x)− x
2
r′(x)
)]
(3.30)
since r′′(x)<0
1
x
∫ x
0
r(s)ds < r
(x
2
)
(3.31)
r(x)− x
2
r′(x) > r
(x
2
)
(3.32)
we may confirm that g(x+1)−g(x) < 0 for x ∈ (L
2
, L
]
. We emphasize that this result
holds for any pair of traplines covering symmetric ranges, any visit time distribution
and any concave renewal function.
In Figure 3.21 we illustrate the difference in average food gain between a popula-
tion of expanders versus a population of shrinkers. We show both the moving average
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and whole average food gain of six expanders and six shrinkers in two separate sys-
tems both consisting of 625 sites where each site in the systems is replenished with
food according to the renewal function r(t) 3.16 where λ = 0.01. We note that the
players consider a line change with probability  ( = 0.01). We shall stick to  = 0.01
for the remainder of the thesis unless we say otherwise.
We define the moving average to be
g¯t+1 =
g1 = 1, t = 1µgt + (1− µ)g¯t−1, t > 1
where:
 The coefficient µ represents the degree of weighting decrease, a constant smooth-
ing factor, 9× 10−5.
 gt is the value at a time period t
 g¯t is the value of the exponential moving average at any time period t
From the graphs, we can see that the population of shrinkers gain more food on
average than the population of expanders which suggests that being an expander in
a population of expanders is not beneficial as you will constantly overlap with others
and therefore eat less food on average (See similar graphs for the 2D case in the
appendix).
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(a) Moving average - Shrinkers (α=0.50) (b) Moving average - Expanders (α=0.90)
(c) Average average - Shrinkers (α=0.50) (d) Average average - Expanders (α=0.90)
Figure 3.21: Moving average and whole average of six expanders and six shrinkers in
two separate systems both consisting of 625 sites. We vary have varied the probability
of the players considering an expansion (α) and fixed their probability of considering
a line change,  ( = 0.01)
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3.3 Stochastic ODE version
After exploring the Iterative model of traplining foraging, we came up with the
stochastic ODE model which is an approximated version of the full model. We mainly
came up with this model because it was prohibitively slow to investigate the full model
version. The stochastic model allowed us to simulate quickly in comparison to the
full model. We note that the stochastic ODE model is a combination of the deter-
ministic case and some random processes. In this model, we have only considered the
two player game. Note that the analysis has been done in collaboration with James
Burridge.
We have three stochastic variables; lA, lB, ω denoting two players’ line lengths
and the number of their shared sites. In Figure 3.22, we represent the players’
home ranges as closed curves within an enclosed rectangle representing the system.
Assuming that the players’ lines are at equilibrium, the intersection of the circles
ω �1 −� �2 −� 
� − �1−�2 + � 
Figure 3.22: Venn diagram showing two birds’ home ranges
represent the overlapping region (ω) and the area outside both circles represents the
territory consisting of sites that the players do not have in their lines. We further
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assume that the sites that the players do not have in their lines have more food than
the players’ average food gain in which case if a player happens to visit any of those
sites she will definitely add it to her line.
Each player maintains a set of unique sites which she traverses in order whilst
recalling the average gain per site, EˆX , for her line where X ∈ {A,B}. We define a
player’s average food gain to be equal to the expectation of the average food gain per
site in her line
E¯X = E[EˆX ]. (3.33)
Each site renews its resources according to the renewal function
r(t) =
1− e−λt
λ
. (3.34)
We define the critical arrival time, τ ∗X , to be the renewal time required for a site to
reach the average food gain of a player.
τ ∗X := r
−1(EˆX) ≈ r−1(E¯X). (3.35)
The quality of the approximation depends on the variance of EˆX . For longer lines
this will be smaller. When testing out a new site, if the time since last visit (by either
player) is greater or equal to τ ∗X then player X will accept the site.
3.3.1 Calculating average food gain.
We consider various cases. Without loss of generality we consider the food gain
for player A. We also treat arrival times as real numbers when averaging over their
distributions.
Case 1: ω = 0
In this case there are no shared sites so
E¯A = r(lA). (3.36)
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Case 2: ω > 0 and lA > lB.
The fraction of shared sites is ω/lA. When player A arrives at a shared site, player
B will certainly have been the most recent visitor. The time since this last visit is
therefore uniformly distributed on [0, lB]. The expectations of the food available is
therefore
S¯A :=
1
lB
∫ lB
0
r(t)dt =
1
λ
+
e−λlB − 1
lBλ2
=: J(λ, lB). (3.37)
Here S stands for shared and we have defined a new function J for later notational
convenience. At non shared sites player A gets
U¯A = r(lA). (3.38)
Here U stands for unique. The overall expectation of food gain per site in this case
is therefore
E¯A =
(
ω
lA
)
S¯A +
(
lA − ω
lA
)
U¯A. (3.39)
Case 3: ω > 0 and lA ≤ lB.
When visiting a shared site, the probability that B was the last visitor is lA/lB. In
that case the time since last visit (by B) is uniform on [0, lA]. If A was the last visitor
then the time since last visit is lA. Putting these two possibilities together we have
S¯A =
(
lA
lB
)
J(λ, lA) +
(
1− lA
lB
)
r(lA). (3.40)
At non shared sites player A gets
U¯A = r(lA). (3.41)
The overall expectation of food gain per site in this case is therefore
E¯A =
(
ω
lA
)
S¯A +
(
lA − ω
lA
)
U¯A. (3.42)
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3.3.2 All cases combined
We can now combine all cases together, giving
E¯A =

r(lA) if ω = 0(
ω
lA
)
J(λ, lB) +
(
lA−ω
lA
)
r(lA) if ω > 0, lA > lB(
ω
lA
) [(
lA
lB
)
J(λ, lA) +
(
1− lA
lB
)
r(lA)
]
+
(
lA−ω
lA
)
r(lA) if ω > 0, lA ≤ lB.
(3.43)
3.3.3 Process of adding a site
At each step of the model, each player has probability  of considering a change to
her line. When a player decides to consider a change she will consider an addition
with probability α where α ∈ [0, 1] is called the expansivity. The process of addition
involves selecting with equal probability a site from the set of sites not currently in
her line.
Case 1: Free site selected.
If a free site is selected then it will definitely be accepted because it will have more
food than any of the players’ average food gain. The probability of selecting (and
accepting) a free site is
pF :=

L−lA−lB+ω
L−lA if lA < L
0 otherwise.
. (3.44)
Case 2: Site already in line of other player is selected
Note that a player will never pick a site that is shared because such sites are already
in her line. For convenience we define the normalized top hat function
u(x; a) :=

1
a
if x ∈ [0, a]
0 otherwise.
(3.45)
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tlAlB
Figure 3.23: Time line showing points at which player 1 (black markers) and player
2 (red markers) visit a shared site, where l1 < l2.
We need to consider two cases (lA ≤ lB and lA > lB). First, let us consider the
case where lA ≤ lB.
Imagine two intervals of length lA and lB (see Figure 3.23). Suppose we fix lA
and move lB back and forth (sliding the red markers). Looking at Figure 3.23, it
is clear to see that the fraction of the time that a red marker is not in between the
black markers corresponds to the fraction of the time that player A has the site to
herself which means that the fraction lA
lB
player B is eating the food from the shared
site before player A which suggests that lB−lA
lB
is the fraction of the time that the
previous visitor to the site was player A.
Using the definition of the uniform distribution on [0, a] we denote the correspond-
ing pdf as
u (s, a) =

1
a
, if s ∈ [0, a] ,
0, otherwise,
We express the probability distribution of the time, T since the last visit as
fT (t) =
lA
lB
u(t; lA) +
(
1− lA
lB
)
δ(t− lA). (3.46)
The new site will be accepted if this time exceeds τ ∗. In this case, τ ∗ is uniformly
distributed on [0, lB] (τ
∗ ∼ u([0, lB])).
The second case to consider is when lA > lB. In this case
fT (t) = u(t; lA). (3.47)
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To allow for both cases we define fT piecewise as follows
fT (t) =

lA
lB
u(t; lA) +
(
1− lA
lB
)
δ(t− lA) if lA ≤ lB
u(t; lA) if lA > lB.
(3.48)
We introduce the cumulative of T
FT (t) =
∫ t
0
fT (s)ds
=

t
max(lA,lB)
if t < lA
1 if t > lB.
(3.49)
In terms of this cumulative, the probability of selecting and accepting a site already
in B’s line is
pS =

(
lB−ω
L−lA
)
[1− FT (τ ∗)] if lA < L
0 otherwise.
(3.50)
3.3.4 Process of removing a site
Having decided to make a change, the probability of considering a removal is 1− α.
Original version
A site is selected at random, and removed if its food gain is less than E¯X . If no sites
are shared then no removal takes place. If some sites are shared, these sites will be
removed if they happen to be selected for consideration. We note that the average
removal rate is therefore ω/lX .
Simple noisy variant
As above, but if ω = 0 then we let the bird remove a site with probability δ. This
reflects the fact that there will be some inherent variability in site quality so even if
none of her sites are shared, there may be one which is significantly worse than the
others to make it worth removing.
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3.3.5 Defining the full dynamics
Without loss of generality let us consider player A. We have, for non-noisy removal
(lA, ω)[t+ δt] =

(lA, ω)[t] w.p. 1− Pδt
(lA − 1, ω − 1)[t] w.p. (1− α)ωδt/lA
(lA + 1, ω)[t] w.p. αpF δt
(lA + 1, ω + 1)[t] w.p. αpSδt
(3.51)
where
P = α(pF + pS) + (1− α)ω/lA. (3.52)
In the case of noisy removal we have
(lA, ω)[t+ δt] =

(lA, ω)[t] w.p. 1− Pδt
(lA − 1, ω)[t] w.p. δ(1− α)1[ω=0]δt
(lA − 1, ω − 1)[t] w.p. (1− α)ωδt/lA
(lA + 1, ω)[t] w.p. αpF δt
(lA + 1, ω + 1)[t] w.p. αpSδt
(3.53)
where
P = α(pF + pS) + (1− α)[ω/lA + δ1[ω=0]]. (3.54)
Note that in 3.53, when player A and player B do not overlap 1[ω=0] indicates that
the probability that either player removes a site from their lines is δ(1− α)δt.
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3.4 Full simulation versus stochastic mean field
model
In this section, we explore the behaviour of two players’ line lengths by using our
stochastic mean field and full simulation. We start by examining the evolution of two
players’ line lengths (l1, l2) and their overlapping region (ω). Next we produce the
growth rates of the players’ line lengths and investigate the different phase transitions
of the players’ line lengths as we vary both their line expansion rate (α) and the system
size (L).
3.4.1 Line lengths
In Figure 3.24, we show the evolution of two players’ line lengths (l1, l2) and their
trapline overlap (ω) using both our full simulation and stochastic mean field model.
From the graphs we can see that both the stochastic mean field model and full simula-
tion approximately produce the same results. In each sub-figure, we have considered
a system consisting of 100 sites (L = 100). Each player in the system considers chang-
ing her line with probability ( = 0.001). We have varied the players’ line expansion
rate, α to see the effect that this has on the players’ line lengths and overlapping
region. Looking at the graphs, we can see that the players have very short lines when
α = 0.2 but as we slightly increase α (α = 0.5) each player uses half of the sites in
the system. When α = 0.7, the players are very expansive and therefore have long
lines up to the point where they use all the sites in the system.
3.4.2 Phase transitions
After exploring the line lengths of two players using our stochastic mean field model
we have discovered that there are five classes of sharing behaviour (see Figure 3.25)
which are mainly determined by the evolution rate, α. We define the five classes of
sharing behaviour as follows
 ‘No sites’ - Players have very short lines and barely share any site
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(a) Full simulation (α=0.2) (b) Stochastic mean field (α=0.2)
(c) Full simulation (α=0.5) (d) Stochastic mean field (α=0.5)
(e) Full simulation (α=0.70) (f) Stochastic mean field (α=0.7)
Figure 3.24: Evolution of two players’ line lengths (l1, l2) and trapline length (ω) using
the full simulation and stochastic mean field model. In each sub-figure, we consider
a system consisting of 100 sites (L = 100) where we have two players with the same
expansion rate, α and the same probability of considering a line change,  ( = 0.01).
 ‘Perfect share’ - Cooperative sharing where each player uses about half of the
sites in the system
 ‘Switching’ - One player dominates for some time whilst the other player shares
all of her sites with the dominant player and at some point in time the roles are
switched
 ‘Dominant’ - One player dominates the entire time by using all sites in the
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system whilst the other player has a very short line and therefore shares all of
her sites with the dominant player
 ‘All sites’ - Players use all the sites in the system; thus share them all.
(a) ‘No sites’ (b) ‘Perfect share’ (cooperative sharing)
(c) ‘Switching’ (d) ‘Dominant’
(e) ‘All sites’
Figure 3.25: Classes of sharing behaviour
Using our stochastic mean field model, we explore the phase diagrams of two
players’ line lengths as we vary the system size (L) and the players’ expansion rate,
α. In Figure 3.26 we show a phase diagram using both our stochastic mean field model
and full simulation. In each sub-figure, the players have a probability  ( = 0.001)
of considering a change and δ = 0.5. From the graphs we can see that the stochastic
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model and full simulation produce about the same result. The only difference is that
we observe a switching phase in the phase diagram produced from the stochastic
mean field and we believe that this is due to the fact that there is some stochastic
effect which is not apparent in the full model.
(a) Stochastic mean field (b) Full simulation
Figure 3.26: Phase transition diagrams of two players’ line lengths - Stochastic mean
field versus full simulation. In both graphs, the players consider a change with prob-
ability  ( = 0.01) where λ = 0.01
In Figure 3.27, we show the phase diagrams of two players’ line lengths for different
λ values. The players have a probability  ( = 0.001) of considering a change and
δ = 0.5. In each graph, we have assigned a colour to each class of sharing behaviour
(Yellow - ‘All sites’, Chartreuse - ‘Switch’, Green - ‘Dominant’, Midnight Blue -
‘Perfect share’, purple - ‘No sites’) where each regime is determined by the players’
line lengths given a system size and the players’ line expansion rate.
From the graphs we can see that there is exactly three different phases for small
λ values (0.00001, 0.0005, 0.001). The ‘No sites’ phase appears from α = 0.1 − 0.2
as the players have very short lines. The ‘Perfect share’ class occurs within the range
α = 0.3− 0.6 and the ‘All sites’ phase occurs between the range α = 0.7− 0.9. As we
increase λ, the dominant and the switching phases start to appear for large enough
systems (α = 0.6) and gradually appear for slightly smaller α (α = 0.3 − 0.5). Also
notice how the perfect share phase slowly disappears as we increase λ.
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(a) λ = 0.00001 (b) λ = 0.0005
(c) λ = 0.001 (d) λ = 0.005
(e) λ = 0.1 (f) λ = 0.5
Figure 3.27: Phase transition diagrams of two players’ line lengths using the stochastic
mean field model as we vary λ. In each sub-figure, we have fixed the probability of
the players changing their lines,  ( = 0.01)
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3.4.3 Growth Rate
During a game a player’s line length varies over time. The different changes that
can happen to a player’s line length can be seen as states. Suppose l(t) represents a
player’s line length at time t. At time t + δt, l(t) can expand, shrink or remain the
same
l(t+ δt)→

l(t) + 1
l(t)
l(t)− 1
Considering the cases for noisy and non-noisy removal (see equation (3.53)), we ex-
press the equations representing the growth rate of two players’ line lengths (∆lA,∆lB)
as follows
Non-Noisy removal:
∆lA = − (1− α)
(
ω
lA
)
+ α (pS + pf ) (3.55)
where − (1− α)
(
ω
lA
)
and α (pS + pf ) are the probabilities of removing and adding
a site respectively.
Noisy removal:
∆lA = − (1− α)
(
ω
lA
+ δω=0
)
+ α (pS + pf ) . (3.56)
In the case of noisy removal we have added δ to the fraction of player A’s shared sites
as there is a small probability that player A will remove one of her shared sites when
ω = 0.
Assuming that lA = lB we have used the above equations (3.55 and 3.56) to
produce the evolution of the net rate of player A’s line length (lA) by experimenting
with different lA values (see equation (3.28)). In each sub-figure, we have considered
a system of size L = 100. We have plotted the lines representing the evolution of the
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net rate of player A’s line for different α values. From the graphs, we can see that
the net rate seems to start off positive for small lA values (lA = 40, 50, 60) as there
are more sites available for the player to add. However, as we increase player A’s line
length the net rate starts off negative because the player has a long line which means
that she shares many of her sites with the other player B. As a result of this, the
probability of removing sites increases. From the graphs, we can also see that as we
increase α the net rate increases and there is some noise effect that allows the players
to hit a fixed point. In other words, there are some stochastic effects that cause the
net rate to go past that fixed point.
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Figure 3.28: Net rate of player A’s line length for different α values as we vary the
size of the overlapping region
In Figures 3.29, 3.30 and 3.31, we show the evolution of the growth rate of two
players’ line lengths using both our full model and stochastic mean field model. In
each graph, we have considered a system consisting of 100 sites (L = 100). In each
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sub-figure, we have varied the probability of the players considering an expansion and
we have fixed the probability of them considering a change,  ( = 0.001).
In the full model we have used an additional parameter, β (β = 500) representing
the decisiveness of the players. In our stochastic mean field, we chose δ to be 0.5 as
this parameter value better reflects the fact that there is some inherent variability
in site quality which gives a small chance that the players could still remove a site
from their lines when they are not sharing any sites (ω = 0). In the full model, the
probability of all sites being equal is minuscule and even if all sites are equal there is
still a fifty per cent chance of removing any of them.
From the graphs we can see that both the full model and stochastic mean field
model give the same results. When α is small (α = 0.10, 0.20) the growth rate is
negative as the players barely add any sites to their lines. One interesting behaviour
to observe is when α is 0.3. In the graph (sub-figure 3.29e) the players start off by
increasing their lines until the growth rate is positive (20 < l < 40). This positive
growth rate remains positive for some time and then drops down for a while until
it becomes positive again. From the graph we can also see that there are two fixed
points (l = 20, 40) where l = 20 is unstable and l = 40 is stable. As we increase α
the growth rate starts off positive and gradually declines until it is negative and then
increases again. For high α values the growth rate is mostly positive but there are
some fluctuations which is due to some stochastic noisy effect.
In Figures 3.29, 3.30 and 3.31 we tried a larger system (L = 500) in order to
simplify the behaviour of the growth rate of the players’ line lengths using both our
simulation and stochastic mean field. From the graphs we can see that the behaviour
is quite similar to the behaviour observed when L = 100 but the stochastic effect is
more apparent when L = 500.
We were not able to do the fixed point analysis but there is a possibility of doing
the analysis for future work. In this section, we have explored the one player and two
player game. In the case of a one player game, we have found that a player can make
use of the sites in the system she is in effectively by using the shortest circuit to visit
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all the known site locations exactly once before returning to them. In other words,
given a system consisting of L sites and assuming that a player visits one site at each
time step, a player should visit each site in the system exactly once after L− 1 steps
as this gives enough time for the site to be replenished with the maximum amount of
food before the player makes another visit to those sites. Hummingbirds, bees, bats,
and primates have been observed exploiting patchily distributed foods that replenish
over time by foraging in this way [206].
In the two player game, we show the similarity between the iterative model of
trapline foraging, the hawk-dove game and the prisoner’s dilemma game. In the
iterative model of trapline foraging, we have found that players with expansive rate
between 0.6−1.0 can be comparable to cheaters in the prisoner’s dilemma as they do
worse than if they were less expansive. On the other hand, the players with expansive
rate 0.5 (α = 0.5) are cooperative players as they use the system more effectively by
each using half of the sites in the system. Note that this type of cooperative behaviour
is referred to as ‘mutually beneficial’ [207, 208] as it benefits both the actor and the
recipient(s). Next, we want to explore the behaviour of a population of shrinkers and
expanders in a two dimensional system whilst introducing birth and death processes.
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Figure 3.29: Growth rate of two players’ line lengths - full simulation versus stochastic
mean field model. Parameter values: L = 100, λ = 0.01,  = 0.001, δ = 0.5 and
β = 500
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Figure 3.30: Growth rate of two players’ line lengths - full simulation versus stochastic
mean field model. Parameter values: L = 100, λ = 0.01,  = 0.001, δ = 0.5 and
β = 500
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Figure 3.31: Growth rate of two players’ line lengths - full simulation versus stochastic
mean field model. Parameter values: L = 100, λ = 0.01,  = 0.001, δ = 0.5 and
β = 500
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Figure 3.32: Growth rate of two players’ line lengths - full simulation versus stochastic
mean field model. Parameter values: L = 500, λ = 0.01,  = 0.001, δ = 0.5 and
β = 500
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Figure 3.33: Growth rate of two players’ line lengths - full simulation versus stochastic
mean field model. Parameter values: L = 500, λ = 0.01,  = 0.001, δ = 0.5 and
β = 500
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(a) Full simulation (α=0.90)
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Figure 3.34: Growth rate of two players’ line lengths - full simulation versus stochastic
mean field model. Parameter values: L = 500, λ = 0.01,  = 0.001, δ = 0.5, β = 500
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Chapter 4
Two dimensional case
In this chapter, we are going to consider two populations who will both on their
own expand but one with a smaller expansion rate because their territories tend
to shrink. We shall call the population with a lower expansion rate “shrinkers”
(α = 0.5) and call the other population “expanders” (α = 0.9). Before we explore the
behaviour of the population of shrinkers and expanders, we first start by describing
the line construction algorithm for the 2D case and then explore a popular biologically
motivated model of evolution in finite populations: birth-Death [209, 210, 112, 211,
212] where we assume that the reproduction is proportional to fitness and death
occurs at random.
4.1 Algorithm
Consider a system represented as an L × L grid where each element in the matrix
represents a site in the system. Given n players in the system, each player has a
trapline, l¯ 3.1 where the sites in a player’s line are arranged such that the Euclidean
distance between any two sites (including the distance between the first and the last
site) in a player’s line is less or equal to the player’s maximum flight distance, which we
denote by Λ. In the next two sub-sections (4.1.1, 4.1.2) we reiterate the moving step
and decision making of a player which we have previously described in the Iterative
model of trapline foraging (3.2.1, 3.2.1). Note that the expansion and contraction
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procedures described in this algorithm (2D case) differs from the ones described in
the Iterative model of trapline foraging.
4.1.1 Moving Step
At each time step, a player decides whether to
1. Visit a new candidate site, consider adding it permanently w.p. α
2. Visit the usual next site and consider removing it w.p. (1− α)
3. Visit the usual next site without considering a change w.p. (1-)
where  is the evolution rate, α is the expansion rate and the abbreviation w.p. means
‘with probability’.
4.1.2 Decision Making
A player visits a site (say i) at time t and eats the food available Ei = r(t − τi)
where τi represents the last visit time at site i by any player. The player then decides
whether to make a change to her line or not. The decision that the player takes is
based on the energy difference between her average food gain E¯ and the amount she
has just eaten, Ei. We express a player’s energy difference and average food gain as
∆E = Ei − E¯ (4.1)
where
E¯ =
m∑
i∈l¯
Ei (4.2)
and m represents the player’s line length.
Expansion procedure
A player can only try out a new site if
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 The Euclidean distance between the site she is currently on and the chosen site
is less or equal to Λ
 The Euclidean distance between the next site in her line and the chosen site is
less or equal to Λ
Thus Λ acts as an upper bound on all of the distances between successive sites within
the (cyclic) trapline. In Figure 4.1 we show a representation of a site that can and
one that cannot be added to a player’s line
l¯ = [a, b] (4.3)
given Λ = 2.
b
d
f
a
 
U < Mb-f
a-fU < M a-d
b-d
U < M
U < M
Figure 4.1: Given the positions of sites a (4, 3), b (3, 4) and d (4, 5) we represent
a line 4.3 on a two dimensional grid where we show that site f cannot be added to
the line since Ua−f , Ub−f > Λ. On the other hand, site d can be added to the player’s
line because the Euclidean distance between site a and d and the Euclidean distance
between b and d are both less than Λ.
Letting xP , yP represent the x and y coordinates of site P ∈ {a, b, d, f, ...}, we
give the positions of sites a, b, d, f within the grid represented in Figure 4.1 as follows
 a: (4, 3)
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 b: (3, 4)
 d: (4, 5)
 f : (1, 1)
Suppose that the player is at site b and considers visiting either site d or f . For
simplicity, we shall assume that both sites (d, f) have more food than the player’s
average food gain. Using the expansion procedure, we aim to explain why site d can
be visited and added to the player’s line and not site f . We shall first look at the
case where the player considers visiting site d and will then look at the case where
the player considers visiting site f . Note that in both cases, we shall assume that the
player is at site b within line 4.3
Case 1: Player considers visiting site d
In order to find out whether site d can be added to the player’s line we must check if
the Euclidean distance between
 site b and site d is less or equal to Λ
 site a and site d is less or equal to Λ
Letting UF−S represent the Euclidean distance between sites F, S ∈ {a, b, d, f, ...}
where F 6= S; we express the Euclidean distance between sites b and d as
Ub−d =
√
2 (4.4)
and for a and d, we have
Ua−d =
√
2. (4.5)
From the results obtained in 4.4 and 4.5 we can say that site d can be added to the
player’s line since Ub−d, Ua−d < Λ.
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Case 2: Player considers visiting site f
Using the same steps as in Case 1, whilst considering the case where the player
considers visiting site f , we express the Euclidean distance between sites b and f ,
Ub−f , and the Euclidean distance between sites a and f as follows
Ub−f =
√
13 (4.6)
Ua−f =
√
13 (4.7)
In this case the results obtained in 4.6 and 4.7 tell us that site f cannot be added to
the player’s line since Ub−f , Ua−f > Λ.
Contraction procedure
A player can only be able to remove the site she is currently visiting if the Euclidean
distance between the previous site in her line and the next site in her line is less or
equal to Λ, otherwise such a removal would lead to a distance between successive sites
exceeding Λ in the resulting trapline.
In Figure 4.2 we show a representation of a site that can and one that cannot be
removed from a player’s line
l¯ = [a, e, d, b, c] (4.8)
given Λ = 1.
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>
Figure 4.2: Given the positions of sites a (2, 2), b (2, 3) and site d (1, 4) we represent
a line on a two dimensional grid where we show that site c can be removed from the
line 4.8 but not site e since the Euclidean distance between site a and d (if removing
e) is greater than Λ (Ua−d > Λ) and the Euclidean distance between site a and b (if
removing c) is less than Λ (Ua−b < Λ) given the positions of the sites.
Letting xP , yP represent the x and y coordinates of site P ∈ {a, b, c, d, e, ...}, we
give the positions of sites a, b, c, d within the grid represented in Figure 4.2 as follows
 a: (2, 2)
 b: (2, 3)
 c: (3, 3)
 d: (1, 4)
 e: (1, 3)
Suppose that the player visits site e and considers removing it from her line. The
removal will only be successful if the Euclidean distance between site a and site d is
less or equal to Λ. Working out the Euclidean distance between sites a and site d,
Ua−d we obtain
Ua−d =
√
5 (4.9)
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and since Ua−d > Λ, site e cannot be removed from line 4.8. Now, let us suppose that
the player visits site c and considers removing it from her line. In this case, we check
whether the Euclidean distance between a and b is less or equal to Λ. Expressing the
Euclidean distance between sites a and b, Ua−b we have
Ua−b =
√
1 (4.10)
and since Ua−b < Λ we can say that c can be removed from the line.
4.2 Evolution of traplines and overlapping region
How well individuals explore a system depends on the competition between them for
the resources necessary for survival and reproduction, often increasing the population
of powerful agents. In our model, we describe a powerful agent as an agent who often
visits new sites in the system she is in; provided that her opponents visit new sites
less frequently. Visiting more sites than the rest of the population is advantageous as
the player obtains more food from the sites she does not share with her opponents;
thus eat more food than others on average. The rate at which players visit new sites
is determined by their line expansion rate, α. The sites that a player visits give
us some valuable insight about their overlapping region. Introducing the maximum
flight distance, Λ, of a population can help us determine the set of sites available for
an agent to visit at each time step. In this section, we shall explore the role of Λ
whilst considering the two player game.
In Figure 4.3 we show the evolution of two players’ overlapping and non-overlapping
regions in a system consisting of 100 sites as we vary both Λ and α. We note that
the number of shared and non-shared sites were averaged over 14 × 104 runs. From
the graphs, we can see that the more expansive a player is the more she overlaps with
her opponent and as a result of this her number of non-shared sites decreases. For
α ∈ [0.7− 0.9], the players use all the sites in the system; thus share them all. When
a player is very expansive and competes for food within a population of expanders,
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we would expect her average food gain to be lower than a less expansive player com-
peting for food in a population of shrinkers (see Figure 3.21). In other words, the
more non-shared sites a player has the higher her average food gain. For low α values
a player often removes the sites she shares (with other players) from her line and thus
has more non-shared sites.
(a) Non-overlapping region (b) Overlapping region
Figure 4.3: Evolution of overlapping and non-overlapping region of two players’ lines
for different α values as Λ varies from 1 to 50.
In Figure 4.4 we show the evolution of two expanders and two shrinkers’ line
lengths in separate 2D systems whilst varying the players’ maximum flight distance,
Λ. The expanders consider a line expansion with probability 0.8 (α = 0.8) whilst the
shrinkers consider a line expansion with probability 0.5 (α = 0.5). When Λ = 2 the
evolution of both shrinkers and expanders’ line lengths is the same as when Λ equals
any value between 1 and 3 (Λ ∈ [1, 3]). Since Λ is small, the players have fewer sites
to choose from and visit at each time step. We can see that the expanders use more
sites than the shrinkers because they often add sites to their lines. In addition, their
maximum flight distance enables them to be more cooperative. On the other hand,
the shrinkers have very short lines and do not explore the system effectively as both
their maximum flight distance (Λ) and line expansion rate (α) penalise them.
As we slightly increase Λ (Λ = 4), we can see that both shrinkers and expanders
use about half of the sites in the system; thus equally do as well. We note that the
behaviour of the players’ line lengths is the same for any Λ values between 4 and 8
(Λ ∈ [4, 8]).
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(a) Λ = 2 (b) Λ = 2
(c) (Λ = 5) (d) (Λ = 5)
(e) Λ = 9 (f) Λ = 9
Figure 4.4: Evolution of two shrinkers and expanders’ line lengths in a system con-
sisting of 100 sites (L × L = 100) as we vary Λ. The players consider a line change
with probability  = 0.01. The shrinkers and expanders consider an expansion with
probabilities α = 0.5 and α = 0.8 respectively.
Increasing the value of Λ (Λ = 9) shows that the shrinkers use half of the sites
in the system whilst the expanders use all the sites in the system. In this case, the
evolution of both shrinkers and expanders’ line lengths are about the same for Λ
values higher than 9.
We can conclude that the maximum flight distance has an effect on the players’
line lengths as it determines the set of sites that the players can choose from and
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visit at each time step. After investigating the evolution of shrinkers and expanders’
line lengths in different systems, we have found that when Λ is sufficiently large
(Λ ≥ 9), both shrinkers and expanders’ line lengths are about the same as in the fully
connected topology. For any Λ value, the players’ overlapping region increases as we
increase α.
4.3 Birth-death process
The theory of birth-death processes was developed in the beginning of the twentieth
century [213, 214, 215] for modelling the growth of a population whilst taking into
account stochastic factors in the evolution of population [216, 217, 218, 49, 219, 220,
221, 222, 223, 224].
The birth-death process is a continuous-time Markov process where the state
transitions are of only two types: ’births’, which increase the state variable by one
and ’deaths’, which decrease the state variable by one [225]. A Markov process is
a random process in which the future is independent of the past, given the present
[94, 226]. If x0 is a vector which represents the initial state of a system, then there
is a matrix M such that the state of the system after one iteration is given by the
vector Mx0. Thus we get a chain of state vectors: x0, Mx0, M
2x0, ... where the state
of the system after n iterations is given by Mnx0. Such a chain is called a Markov
chain and the matrix M is called a transition matrix.
Birth-death processes are widely used in real world systems such as ecology, pop-
ulation biology [227] and genetics [228, 229, 230]. BDPs can characterise evolution of
genes [231], epidemic dynamics [232], speciation and extinction [233]. There are many
environmental and social factors that affect reproductive success in living organisms
[234, 235]. An organism generally reacts to its environment by selecting the optimum
conditions for its own existence [236, 237]. The physical factors that may affect or-
ganisms include: temperature, amount of light, availability of water, nutrients and of
oxygen and carbon dioxide [238, 239, 240, 241].
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Previous work has been done on birth-death rates [242, 243]. For example, Ver-
hulst first introduced a logistic type of growth in the mid 1800s [244]. The evolution
of a population can be described using the difference equation
Nt+1 = rNt
(
1− Nt
K
)
(4.11)
where Nt is the population at time t, r is the intrinsic relative growth rate, and K is
the carrying capacity. The carrying capacity is commonly incorporated in population
dynamics models. Limitations on space, food supply and other necessities suppress
growth. Each organism, subject to a survival probability, Vt = 1 − NtK is known as
the Verhulst factor [245]. The main motivation for the Verhulst factor is to make
certain that population sizes are kept finite [246]. In this thesis, we use the birth-
death process to explore the dynamics of a population of expanders and shrinkers on
a 2D lattice whilst making the simplifying assumption that all individuals are able to
give birth to new individuals.
4.3.1 Dynamics
Using the algorithm for the 2D case, we introduce Eo to be the minimum energy
needed for each player to reproduce, δ, the death rate and ρ the rate at which a
player tries to give birth. We want to understand the dynamics of a population of
trapliners as new individuals appear, others die, and neighbours interact with each
other. For simplicity, we shall assume that there are only female players as they all
have the potential to reproduce.
Death process
At each time step, a player dies with probability δ. When a player dies, her entire
memory (trapline) is wiped out from the system and the sites she was in possession of
automatically become available to other players; thus leaving room for other players
to expand their territories.
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Birth process
A player reproduces with probability ρ. For the purpose of this research, we shall
assume that δ < ρ such that there are more births than deaths. When a player
tries to reproduce a reproduction is successful if the difference in energy between the
average energy per site in her line and Eo is greater than zero (E¯ > Eo) otherwise no
reproduction takes place. When a player gives birth, her offspring inherits the same
α value as her parent. We assume that a player’s offspring starts traplining from the
site her parent is currently on with a trivial single-site trapline. Note that this reflects
the fact that an offspring is born where their mother is located and after having grown
large enough they start building up their lines. In our analysis we neglect the fact
that the offspring follows the mother for some time in order to learn from her how
to forage for food. The expansive rate which the offspring inherits from her mother
already gives enough knowledge to the offspring to forage like their mothers.
In the next two sub-sections, we shall first explore the behaviour of shrinkers and
expanders in separate systems whilst relating the dynamics of both populations to
the hawk-dove game and prisoner’s dilemma game. We differentiate expanders and
shrinkers by their line expansion rate, α; where the shrinkers consider an expansion
with probability 0.5 while the expanders consider an expansion with probability 0.9.
Next, we will explore the behaviour of both populations (shrinkers and expanders) in
the same system and show that expanders and shrinkers cannot stably coexist in the
same environment.
4.3.2 Shrinkers and expanders in separate systems
In this part of the research we aim to understand the behaviour of both shrinkers and
expanders in separate systems. We will first look at the case where we restrain the
players’ maximum flight distance (Λ = 5) and we will then look at the case where the
players can travel wherever they want within the system (Λ = 70). Considering the
two cases, we explore the evolution of the population growth as well as the players’
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average food gain whilst varying the minimum energy required for the players to
survive and reproduce, Eo.
In Figures 4.5 we show the evolution of the number of shrinkers and expanders
in two separate systems for different Eo values whilst fixing the players’ maximum
flight distance Λ = 5. In each sub-figure, we consider a system consisting of 2500
sites (50×50 lattice) in which we initially have 24 players. A birth and a death occur
with probabilities ρ = 2× 10−5 and δ = 10−5 respectively. We stick to ρ = 2× 10−5,
δ = 10−5, Λ = 70, Λ = 5 and L = 50 for the remainder of the thesis unless we say
otherwise. Note that the point of picking a big Λ value (Λ >
√
L2 + L2) is to check
that the model behaves in a similar way to the non-spatial model. When Eo = 10
(a) Shrinkers, Eo = 10 (b) Expanders, Eo = 10
(c) Shrinkers, Eo = 40 (d) Expanders, Eo = 40
Figure 4.5: Evolution of the number of shrinkers and expanders in separate systems
consisting of 2500 sites (L × L = 2500) where the players maximum flight distance,
Λ = 5. Each site in the system is replenished with food according to a non-linear
renewal function 3.16 where λ = 0.01. The players consider a change with probability
 = 0.01 and a birth and death occur with probabilities ρ = 2 × 10−5 and δ = 10−5
respectively
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the players do not need much energy to survive and reproduce which means that
many births occur. However, when Eo = 40 there are fewer players in the system
as it becomes harder for the players to survive and reproduce. The population of
shrinkers is lower than the population of expanders because the shrinkers do not often
try out new sites and their maximum flight distance also penalises their population
growth. On the other hand, the population of expanders reaches a stable state because
whenever a player dies some players quickly use the new available sites which gives
at least one of the players enough energy to reproduce.
In Figure 4.6 we show the evolution of the players’ average food gain for the
corresponding graphs shown in Figure 4.5. When Eo = 10, the population of shrinkers
eat more on average in comparison to the population of expanders. This is due to
the fact that having fewer shrinkers in the system gives them enough room to avoid
overlapping too much; thus the players eat more on average. On the other hand, the
population of expanders eat the minimum energy required to survive as the players
often expand their lines and therefore overlap with others.
In figure 4.7 we show the evolution of the number of players when the players are
allowed to travel wherever they want at each time step within the system (Λ = 70).
We use the same parameter values as the ones used in Figures 4.5. From the graphs
we can see that the systems of both shrinkers and expanders reach stability for all
Eo values. The number of births and deaths are about the same once the system has
reached equilibrium because whenever a player dies there is room for other players
to make use of the available sites giving them an opportunity to reproduce. When
the players’ minimum energy required is 10 (Eo = 10) both the number of shrinkers
and expanders are about the same. As we increase Eo there are more shrinkers than
expanders which suggests that allowing the players to travel wherever they want in
the system gives an advantage to the shrinkers as they use the system more effectively
and therefore reproduce more often than expanders.
In Figure 4.8 we show the evolution of the players’ average food gain corresponding
to the graphs shown in Figure 4.7. From the graphs we can see that both populations
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(a) Shrinkers, Eo = 10 (b) Expanders, Eo = 10
(c) Shrinkers, Eo = 40 (d) Expanders, Eo = 40
Figure 4.6: Evolution of shrinkers and expanders’ average food gain in separate sys-
tems consisting of 2500 (L = 50) sites where the players maximum flight distance,
Λ = 5. A birth and death occur with probabilities ρ = 2 × 10−5 and δ = 10−5
respectively
gain about the same amount of food on average.
Conclusion
After exploring the evolution of shrinkers and expanders in different systems we have
found that the population of shrinkers gain more on average in comparison to the
population of expanders when their maximum flight distance and minimum energy
required to survive are sufficiently small (Λ = 5, Eo = 10). This is due to the fact
that the shrinkers do not overlap as much as the expanders. However, as we increase
Eo the population of shrinkers eventually dies because they do not explore the system
quickly enough to gain enough energy to survive.
Allowing the players to travel wherever they want gives an advantage to the
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(a) Shrinkers, Eo = 10 (b) Expanders, Eo = 10
(c) Shrinkers, Eo = 40 (d) Expanders, Eo = 40
Figure 4.7: Evolution of the number of shrinkers and expanders in separate systems
consisting of 2500 sites (L = 50) where the players maximum flight distance, Λ = 70.
A birth and death occur with probabilities ρ = 2× 10−5 and δ = 10−5 respectively
shrinkers in comparison to the expanders as there are more sites available for the
players to choose from and visit. The shrinkers are able to remove more of their
shared sites and therefore have enough energy to reproduce. On the hand, expanders
often add sites and therefore overlap with others. As a result, when Eo = 40 there
are fewer expanders than shrinkers.
4.3.3 Shrinkers and expanders in the same system
A fundamental concept in ecology is the Gause’s law [247, 248]. This states that
two species with similar ecological niches cannot stably coexist (live in the same
environment) [249, 250]. One of the competitors will always have an ever so slight
advantage and out-compete the other in the long run assuming the species are in
a hypothetical non-evolving system. Consequently the more competitive species will
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(a) Shrinkers, Eo = 10 (b) Expanders, Eo = 10
(c) Shrinkers, Eo = 40 (d) Expanders, Eo = 40
Figure 4.8: Evolution of shrinkers and expanders’ average food gain in separate sys-
tems consisting of 2500 sites (L = 50) where the players maximum flight distance,
Λ = 70. A birth and death occur with probabilities ρ = 2 × 10−5 and δ = 10−5
respectively
stay and the subordinate one will either adapt or be excluded (by either emigration or
extinction). In this sub-section we explore the behaviour of expanders and shrinkers
in the same system. We look at the cases where the minimum energy required for
the players to reproduce are 10 and 50 (Eo = 10 and Eo = 50).
In Figure 4.9, we show the number of shrinkers and expanders whilst considering
the players’ maximum flight distance Λ = 5. We started running the system with 12
expanders and 12 shrinkers and watched both populations evolve over time. We stick
to n = 12× 105 for the remainder of the thesis. From the graphs, we can see that the
population of expanders increases rapidly as the players often add sites to their lines
and therefore have enough energy to reproduce. Note that when Eo = 10 there are
more expanders in the system than when Eo = 50 because it is easier for the players
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to gain less food (Eo = 10) than it is to gain more food (Eo = 50).
(a) Eo = 10 (b) Eo = 50
Figure 4.9: Comparison between the evolution of the number of shrinkers and ex-
panders’ when Eo = 10 and Eo = 50. Players’ maximum flight distance is Λ = 5.
Also notice how the population of shrinkers survive longer when their minimum
energy food gain is low (Eo = 10) than when it is high (Eo = 50) (see Figure 4.10) In
(a) Eo = 10 (b) Eo = 50
Figure 4.10: Comparison between the evolution of shrinkers and expanders’ average
food gain when Eo = 10 and Eo = 50. Players’ maximum flight distance Λ = 5.
Figure 4.11, we show the evolution of the number of shrinkers and expanders when
the players are able to visit any site in the system at each time step (Λ = 5× 1010).
Again, the population of shrinkers dies at some point. However, the population
survives longer than they do when their maximum flight distance Λ = 5.
In Figure 4.12, we show the evolution of the players’ average food gain for the
corresponding graphs shown in Figure 4.11. When Eo = 10 both the population
of shrinkers and expanders do equally as well over time as there are enough good
sites for the players to visit. However, after some time the average food gain of both
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(a) Eo = 10 (b) Eo = 50
Figure 4.11: Comparison between the evolution of the number of shrinkers and ex-
panders’ traplines when Eo = 10 and Eo = 50. Players’ maximum flight distance is
Λ = 5× 1010.
populations drops at around 10 which suggests that there are no longer any unused
sites. At some point in time, the population of shrinkers dies because the shrinkers’
average food gain goes below 10. In the case where Eo = 50 the players gain about
the minimum energy required for the players to survive. However, after some time
the population of shrinkers dies as the players often remove the sites they are sharing
with other players.
(a) Steps=12× 105, Eo = 10 (b) Steps=12× 105, Eo = 50
Figure 4.12: Comparison between the evolution of shrinkers and expanders’ average
food gain when Eo = 10 and Eo = 50. Players’ maximum flight distance is Λ = 70.
Conclusion
When considering the case where the player can visit any site in the system, we have
found that the expanders do worse on average compared to the case where Λ = 5.
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This is due to the fact that the players overlap more frequently with others. On the
other hand, the population of shrinkers do better when Λ = 5× 1010 because they do
not often add sites to their lines. However, in both cases the population of shrinkers
dies because expanders have a higher expansion rate (α) which gives them an ever
slight advantage to out-compete the population of shrinkers. In this scenario, the
population of expanders behaves in the same way as the population of hawks in the
hawk-dove game whereas the population of shrinkers behave in the same way as the
population of doves.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
Our work on the dynamics of social interaction with memory and trapline foraging
have shown a range of interesting findings which can be extended for future work. A
direct link between both is the use of memory.
Using game theory, we analysed the temporal dynamics of a large population
of agents who recall each other’s previous actions whilst assuming that individuals
are anti-conformists. We first provided an alternative derivation of the results in
a recently published analysis of memory effects in the hawk-dove game and then
extended the work to three types of memory: bus-stop memory, exponential memory
and mixed (bus-stop and exponential memory). In the bus-stop memory, we found
that when agents have a small memory, the system possesses a stable fixed point.
However, having a long memory or update rate destabilises the fixed point which
then creates a limit cycle via a Hopf bifurcation. In the exponential memory, we
found that the average probability weight associated with the ‘hawk’ strategy reaches
stability for any memory length and update rate. In the bus-stop and exponential
memory kernel, a player uses the bus-stop memory with probability p and uses the
exponential memory with probability 1−p. The probabilities 1−p and p govern how
stable and unstable a system is.
Next, we have explored the anticonformist dynamics of a new type of game con-
sidering the non-spatial case. Using the gamma memory kernel, we have simulated
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the behaviour of the average strategy for a group of players and have found that if
two oscillations are out of phase then provided the coupling is not too strong, over
time they come to phase. We note that the parameter β in the gamma distribution
determines whether the behaviour of the population is stable or not. In other words,
β measures strength of the conformity.
We have used two minimal statistical physics style models (‘Cross dynamics of
space use’ and the ’Iterative model of trapline foraging’) to explore the movement
patterns of individuals while capturing their memory and interactions. In the cross
dynamics of space use, we have looked at the evolution of strategies by means of a
learning process between interacting agents. From this model, we have found that
the payoffs of players corresponding to a given profile of strategies are negatively
correlated and that correlation has a significant effect on the expected number of Nash
equilibria. From the simulation results, we have also found that players eventually
settle on a particular strategy without ever changing it. This behaviour is less natural
because we would expect players to occasionally change their strategies.
When exploring the stochastic ODE model, we have discovered that there are five
classes of sharing behaviour: ‘No sites’, ‘Perfect share’, ‘Switching’, ‘Dominant’ and
‘All sites’ (see list 3.4.2 for definition of each class of sharing behaviour). We have
found that the ‘switching’ phase does not appear in the full simulation (see Figure
3.26) and we believe that this is due to memory effects not captured by Markov
process. Note that the stochastic ODE model offers the hope of a fixed point analysis
in the future.
After exploring the birth-death process, we have found that a population of
shrinkers do better than a population of expanders provided that the populations
are in two different systems. However, when considering the case where shrinkers and
expanders are in the same system we have found that shrinkers and expanders cannot
coexist in the same system as the population of expanders always out-compete the
population of shrinkers in the long run. Consequently, shrinkers are excluded from
the system as they become extinct.
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We could model the dynamics of strategy change influenced by the frequency of
competing strategies by using other types of games such as the prisoner’s dilemma
game. We could use the Iterative model of trapline foraging to explore more than
two players by adapting our stochastic ODE model to more than two players. When
exploring the birth-death process, we could look at the case where offsprings have
different line expansion rate to their parents.
Considering both the population of hawks and doves, we could use a modified
version of the Moran process [251] updated to include energy. The Moran process is
a stochastic model used to describe finite populations [252]. A population is said to
evolve under the Moran model if:
 The population has a constant size M
 Generations are allowed to overlap
 At discrete time intervals, two members a and b of the population are chosen
at random (a and b can be the same). a reproduces and b dies.
In our updated version of the Moran process, an individual with enough energy to
reproduce is chosen at random for reproduction, though with a probability propor-
tional to its fitness. This individual produces an offspring which replaces a randomly
chosen individual in the system. This will not only mimic the case where a population
of hawks and doves reaches the carrying capacity for their habitat but will also make
it more likely for both populations to cohabit in the same system.
The geometry of the game is quite complicated because the interaction between
agents occur at random. Although in the long run the more expansive players do
well, we could penalise them such that they pay a short term penalty by having lower
food rewards. Also, if the refill rate is very slow it will be bad to overlap and there
will come a point where players with longer lines will not gain very much by having
longer lines as it will not be worth expanding lines.
Note that there is a cost for maintaining a longer trapline and to having to cope
with constantly changing lines. In other words, there is short term cost for expanding
142
into somebody else’s territory because of lower reward while waiting for shared sites
to become non-shared.
The strategies are metaphors for hawk-dove as the game explored using the itera-
tive model is not exactly even to the hawk-dove game. There is no form of equivalence
because of the influence of the geometry spatial effects and memory.
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